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THE JOURNAL
OF
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

OCTOBER, 1872.

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WILL CONTAIN, BESIDES OTHER MATTER, THE FOLLOWING ARTICLES, PREPARED EXPRESSLY FOR THIS JOURNAL:

- I. Rosenkranz's Pedagogies (continuation), translated by Anna C. Brackett.
- II. Criticism of Berkeley's Idealism, by James Hutchinson Stirling, LL.D., of Edinburgh.
- III. The Philosophy of Law (continuation), by the same author. *This is a reprint.*
- IV. Interpretation of Kant's Critic of Pure Reason (continuation), by Simon S. Laurie, F.R.S., of Edinburgh.
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- VIII. Leibnitz's Abridged Statement of his Theodicy, translated by A. E. Kroeger.
- IX. Fichte's Facts of Consciousness (conclusion), translated by A. E. Kroeger.
- X. On the Music of Mendelssohn, Schuman, Liszt, and others, by Professor E. Sobolewski. [This distinguished composer was engaged on a series of articles for this Journal at the time of his death in the summer of 1872.]
- XI. Schopenhauer: Another Extract from the *Parerga* and *Paralipomena*. Translated by Dr. C. Joseph.
- XII. Rosenkranz: Continuation of chapters from his work on "Hegel as the National Philosopher of Germany"; these treat of Psychology, *Aesthetics*, Religion, History of Philosophy, &c. Translated by Professor G. S. Hall, of Antioch College.
- XIII. Aristotle's *De Anima*, translated and accompanied with a Commentary by Prof. Thomas Davidson.

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THE JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY.

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DO THE CORRELATIONISTS BELIEVE IN SELF-MOVEMENT?

Self-movement, spontaneity, and freedom, are in some sense synonyms. He who cannot think self-movement, cannot think freedom. Materialistic philosophy is distinguished from spiritual philosophy, or idealism, through the fact that the former thinks all phenomena under the categories of cause and effect, or of external determination; while the latter thinks all phenomena as arising in the last analysis through self-determination, or through final causes. Plato and Aristotle agree in this latter view, and with them stand the other great thinkers of the race, such as Leibnitz, Spinoza, and Hegel. That any hypothesis results, when strictly tortured in the logical crucible, in positing *causa sui* as its necessary condition, is the demonstrated outcome of Spinoza's Ethics, as well as Hegel's Logic and the twelfth book of Aristotle's Metaphysics.

The feeblest and most dogmatic thinking (i.e. thinking which has to do with mere opinions) is best satisfied with mechanical causes. It is cultured thought which learns to perceive *Necessity* and *Universality* in its ideas. The highest thinking identifies necessity and freedom through the idea of self-determination.

Since the course of history and the laws of development alike point to a progress from the simple to the complex, from the implicit to the explicit, from the acorn to the oak,—we look with confidence to see a growth in the scientific mind from age to age. In the great intensity with which Natural Science is pursued, there is occasion for great improvement in methods of thinking.

Depth and Exhaustiveness—Comprehension—will be gained. This can be seen already in the foremost ranks.

Those who uphold the theory of Correlation set out with materialistic hypotheses, and nothing is further from their expectations than the support of spiritual, ideal conclusions. They think in fatalistic forms, and do not admit self-determination. Spencer says (*Psychology*, § 220) that psychical changes (thoughts, &c.) conform to law, or else a science of Psychology is impossible; and "if they do conform to law, there cannot be any such thing as free-will." And yet the idea of Correlation, when reduced to its lowest terms, gives us self-movement pure and simple. One force becomes another and the second a third, and so on; the first is an equivalent and may be derived from the last. The action of the first produces the second and the rest, and the rest produce it; thus its energy reverts to itself—no matter how long the series of links may be. Its action is the cause of its action, and hence it becomes *causa sui*. But the thought of this total of action is not a mere force, still less a material somewhat; it is a vital system, a whole, a monad. This thought once grasped, materialism passes over to idealism; fatalism gives way to free personality.

PEDAGOGICS AS A SYSTEM.


By Dr. Karl Rosenkranz, Doctor of Theology and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Königsberg.

Translated by ANNA C. BRACKETT.

[Inquiries from teachers in different sections of the country as to the sources of information on the subject of Teaching as a Science have led me to believe that a translation of Rosenkranz's Pedagogics may be widely acceptable and useful. It is very certain that too much of our teaching is simply empirical, and as Germany has, more than any other country, endeavored to found it upon universal truths, it is to that country that we must at present look for a remedy for this empiricism.

Based as this is upon the profoundest system of German Philosophy, no more suggestive treatise on Education can perhaps be found. In his third part, as will be readily seen, Rosenkranz follows the classification of National ideas given in Hegel's *Philosophy of History*. The word "Pedagogics," though it has unfortunately acquired a somewhat unpleasant meaning in English—thanks to the writers who have made the word "pedagogue" so odious—deserves to be redeemed for future use. I have, therefore, retained it in the translation.

In order that the reader may see the general scope of the work, I append in tabular form the table of contents, giving however, under the first and second parts, only the main divisions. The minor heads can, of course, as they appear in the translation, be easily located.—*Tr.*]

Analysis.**INTRODUCTION.**

§ 1. The science of Pedagogics cannot be derived from a simple principle with such exactness as Logic and Ethics. It is rather a mixed science which has its presuppositions in many others. In this respect it resembles Medicine, with which it has this also in common, that it must make a distinction between a sound and an unhealthy system of education, and must devise means to prevent or to cure the latter. It may therefore have, like Medicine, the three departments of Physiology, Pathology, and Therapeutics.

§ 2. Since Pedagogics is capable of no such exact definitions of its principle and no such logical deduction as other sciences, the treatises written upon it abound more in shallowness than any other literature. Short-sightedness and arrogance find in it a most congenial atmosphere, and criticism

and declamatory bombast flourish in perfection as nowhere else. The literature of religious tracts might be considered to rival that of Pedagogics in its superficiality and assurance, if it did not for the most part seem itself to belong, through its ascetic nature, to Pedagogics. But teachers as persons should be treated in their weaknesses and failures with the utmost consideration, because they are most of them sincere in contributing their mite for the improvement of education, and all their pedagogic practice inclines them towards administering reproof and giving advice.

§ 3. The charlatanism of educational literature is also fostered by the fact that teaching has become one of the most profitable employments, and the competition in it tends to increase self-glorification.

— When “Boz” in his “Nicholas Nickleby” exposed the horrible mysteries of an English boarding-school, many teachers of such schools were, as he assures us, so accurately described that they openly complained he had aimed his caricatures directly at them.—

§ 4. In the system of the sciences, Pedagogics belongs to the Philosophy of Spirit,—and in this, to the department of Practical Philosophy, the problem of which is the comprehension of the necessity of freedom; for education is the conscious working of one will on another so as to produce itself in it according to a determinate aim. The idea of subjective spirit, as well as that of Art, Science, and Religion, forms the essential condition for Pedagogics, but does not contain its principle. If one thinks out a complete statement of Practical Philosophy (Ethics), Pedagogics may be distributed among all its grades. But the point at which Pedagogics itself becomes organic is the idea of the Family, because in the family the difference between the adults and the minors enters directly through the naturalness of spirit, and the right of the children to an education and the duty of parents towards them in this respect is incontestable. All other spheres of education, in order to succeed, must presuppose a true family life. They may extend and complement the business of teaching, but cannot be its original foundation.

—In our systematic exposition of Education, we must not allow ourselves to be led into error by those theories which

do not recognize the family, and which limit the relation of husband and wife to the producing of children. The Platonic Philosophy is the most worthy representative of this class. Later writers who take great pleasure in seeing the world full of children, but who would subtract from the love to a wife all truth and from that to children all care, exhibit in their doctrine of the anarchy of love only a sickly (but yet how prevalent an) imitation of the Platonic state.—

§ 5. Much confusion also arises from the fact that many do not clearly enough draw the distinction between Pedagogics as a science and Pedagogics as an art. As a science it busies itself with developing *a priori* the idea of Education in the universality and necessity of that idea, but as an art it is the concrete individualizing of this abstract idea in any given case. And in any such given case, the peculiarities of the person who is to be educated and all the previously existing circumstances necessitate a modification of the universal aims and ends, which modification cannot be provided for beforehand, but must rather test the ready tact of the educator who knows how to make the existing conditions fulfil his desired end. It is exactly in doing this that the educator may show himself inventive and creative, and that pedagogic talent can distinguish itself. The word "art" is here used in the same way as it is used when we say, the art of war, the art of government, &c.; and rightly, for we are talking about the possibility of the realization of the idea.

—The educator must adapt himself to the pupil, but not to such a degree as to imply that the pupil is incapable of change, and he must also be sure that the pupil shall learn through his experience the independence of the object studied, which remains uninfluenced by his variable personal moods, and the adaptation on the teacher's part must never compromise this independence.—

§ 6. If conditions which are local, temporal, and individual, are fixed as constant rules, and carried beyond their proper limits, are systematized as a valuable formalistic code, unavoidable error arises. The formulæ of teaching are admirable material for the science, but are not the science itself.

§ 7. Pedagogics as a science must (1) unfold the general idea of Education; (2) must exhibit the particular phases into

which the general work of Education divides itself, and (3) must describe the particular standpoint upon which the general idea realizes itself, or should become real in its special processes at any particular time.

§ 8. The treatment of the first part offers no difficulty. It is logically too evident. But it would not do to substitute for it the history of Pedagogics, simply because all the conceptions of it which appear in systematic treatises can be found there.

—Into this error G. Thaulow has fallen in his pamphlet on *Pedagogics as a Philosophical Science*.—

§ 9. The second division unfolds the subject of the physical, intellectual and practical culture of the human race, and constitutes the main part of all books on Pedagogy. Here arises the greatest difficulty as to the limitations, partly because of the undefined nature of the ideas, partly because of the degree of amplification which the details demand. Here is the field of the widest possible differences. If e.g. one studies out the conception of the school with reference to the qualitative specialities which one may consider, it is evident that he can extend his remarks indefinitely; he may speak thus of technological schools of all kinds, to teach mining, navigation, war, art, &c.

§ 10. The third division distinguishes between the different standpoints which are possible in the working out of the conception of Education in its special elements, and which therefore produce different systems of Education wherein the general and the particular are individualized in a special manner. In every system the general tendencies of the idea of education, and the difference between the physical, intellectual and practical culture of man, must be formally recognized, and will appear. The How is decided by the standpoint which reduces that formalism to a special system. Thus it becomes possible to discover the essential contents of the history of Pedagogics from its idea, since this can furnish not an indefinite but a certain number of Pedagogic systems.

—The lower standpoint merges always into the higher, and in so doing first attains its full meaning, e.g.: Education for the sake of the nation is set aside for higher standpoints, e.g. that of Christianity; but we must not suppose that the na-

tional phase of Education was counted as nought from the Christian standpoint. Rather it itself had outgrown the limits which, though suitable enough for its early stage, could no longer contain its true idea. This is sure to be the case in the fact that the national individualities become indestructible by being incorporated into Christianity—a fact that contradicts the abstract seizing of such relations.—

§ 11. The last system must be that of the present, and since this is certainly on one side the result of all the past, while on the other seized in its possibilities it is determined by the Future, the business of Pedagogics cannot pause till it reaches its ideal of the general and special determinations, so that looked at in this way the Science of Pedagogics at its end returns to its beginning. The first and second divisions already contain the idea of the system necessary for the Present.

FIRST PART.

The General Idea of Education.

- § 12. The idea of Pedagogics in general must distinguish,
- (1) The nature of Education in general;
 - (2) Its form;
 - (3) Its limits.

I.

The Nature of Education.

§ 13. The nature of Education is determined by the nature of mind—that it can develop whatever it really is only by its own activity. Mind is in itself free; but if it does not actualize this possibility, it is in no true sense free, either for itself or for another. Education is the influencing of man by man, and it has for its end to lead him to actualize himself through his own efforts. The attainment of perfect manhood as the actualization of the Freedom necessary to mind constitutes the nature of Education in general.

—The completely isolated man does not become man. Solitary human beings who have been found in forests, like the wild girl of the forest of Ardennes, sufficiently prove the fact that the truly human qualities in man cannot be developed without reciprocal action with human beings. Caspar Hauser in his subterranean prison is an illustration of what man

would be by himself. The first cry of the child expresses in its appeals to others this helplessness of spirituality on the side of nature.—

§ 14. Man, therefore, is the only fit subject for education. We often speak, it is true, of the education of plants and animals; but even when we do so, we apply, unconsciously perhaps, other expressions, as "raising" and "training," in order to distinguish these. "Breaking" consists in producing in an animal, either by pain or pleasure of the senses, an activity of which, it is true, he is capable, but which he never would have developed if left to himself. On the other hand, it is the nature of Education only to assist in the producing of that which the subject would strive most earnestly to develop for himself if he had a clear idea of himself. We speak of raising trees and animals, but not of raising men; and it is only a planter who looks to his slaves only for an increase in their number.

—The education of men is quite often enough, unfortunately, only a "breaking," and here and there still may be found examples where one tries to teach mechanically, not through the understanding power of the creative WORD, but through the powerless and fruitless appeal to physical pain.—

§ 15. The idea of Education may be more or less comprehensive. We use it in the widest sense when we speak of the Education of the race, for we understand by this expression the connection which the acts and situations of different nations have to each other, as different steps towards self-conscious freedom. In this the world-spirit is the teacher.

§ 16. In a more restricted sense we mean by Education the shaping of the individual life by the forces of nature, the rhythmical movement of national customs, and the might of destiny in which each one finds limits set to his arbitrary will. These often mould him into a man without his knowledge. For he cannot act in opposition to nature, nor offend the ethical sense of the people among whom he dwells, nor despise the leading of destiny without discovering through experience that before the Nemesis of these substantial elements his subjective power can dash itself only to be shattered. If he perversely and persistently rejects all our admonitions, we leave him, as a last resort, to destiny, whose iron rule must

educate him, and reveal to him the God whom he has misunderstood.

—It is, of course, sometimes not only possible, but necessary for one, moved by the highest sense of morality, to act in opposition to the laws of nature, to offend the ethical sense of the people that surround him, and to brave the blows of destiny ; but such a one is a sublime reformer or martyr, and we are not now speaking of such, but of the perverse, the frivolous, and the conceited.—

§ 17. In the narrowest sense, which however is the usual one, we mean by Education the influence which one mind exerts on another in order to cultivate the latter in some understood and methodical way, either generally or with reference to some special aim. The educator must, therefore, be relatively finished in his own education, and the pupil must possess unlimited confidence in him. If authority be wanting on the one side, or respect and obedience on the other, this ethical basis of development must fail, and it demands in the very highest degree, talent, knowledge, skill, and prudence.

—Education takes on this form only under the culture which has been developed through the influence of city life. Up to that time we have the naïve period of education, which holds to the general powers of nature, of national customs, and of destiny, and which lasts for a long time among the rural populations. But in the city a greater complication of events, an uncertainty of the results of reflection, a working out of individuality, and a need of the possession of many arts and trades, make their appearance and render it impossible for men longer to be ruled by mere custom. The Telemachus of Fenelon was educated to rule himself by means of reflection ; the actual Telemachus in the heroic age lived simply according to custom.—

§ 18. The general problem of Education is the development of the theoretical and practical reason in the individual. If we say that to educate one means to fashion him into morality, we do not make our definition sufficiently comprehensive, because we say nothing of intelligence, and thus confound education and ethics. A man is not merely a human being, but as a reasonable being he is a peculiar individual, and different from all others of the race.

§ 19. Education must lead the pupil by an interconnected series of efforts previously foreseen and arranged by the teacher to a definite end ; but the particular form which this shall take must be determined by the peculiar character of the pupil's mind and the situation in which he is found. Hasty and inconsiderate work may accomplish much, but only *systematic* work can advance and fashion him in conformity with his nature, and the former does not belong to education, for this includes in itself the idea of an end, and that of the technical means for its attainment.

§ 20. But as culture comes to mean more and more, there becomes necessary a division of the business of teaching among different persons, with reference to capabilities and knowledge, because as the arts and sciences are continually increasing in number, one can become learned in any one branch only by devoting himself exclusively to it, and hence becoming one-sided. A difficulty hence arises which is also one for the pupil, of preserving, in spite of this unavoidable one-sidedness, the unity and wholeness which are necessary to humanity.

—The naïve dignity of the happy savage, and the agreeable simplicity of country people, appear to very great advantage when contrasted on this side with the often unlimited narrowness of a special trade, and the endless curtailing of the wholeness of man by the pruning processes of city life. Thus the often abused savage has his hut, his family, his cocoa tree, his weapons, his passions ; he fishes, hunts, plays, fights, adorns himself, and enjoys the consciousness that he is the centre of a whole, while a modern citizen is often only an abstract expression of culture.—

§ 21. As it becomes necessary to divide the work of teaching, a difference between general and special schools arises also, from the needs of growing culture. The former present in different compass all the sciences and arts which are included in the term "general education," and which were classified by the Greeks under the general name of Encyclopædia. The latter are known as special schools, suited to particular needs or talents.

—As those who live in the country are relatively isolated, it is often necessary, or at least desirable, that one man should

be trained equally on many different sides. The poor tutor is required not only to instruct in all the sciences, he must also speak French and be able to play the piano.—

§ 22. For any single person, the relation of his actual education to its infinite possibilities can only be approximately determined, and it can be considered as only relatively finished on any one side. Education is impossible to him who is born an idiot, since the want of the power of generalizing and of ideality of conscious personality leaves to such an unfortunate only the possibility of a mechanical training.

—Sägert, the teacher of the deaf mutes in Berlin, has made laudable efforts to educate idiots, but the account as given in his publication, "Cure of Idiots by an Intellectual Method, Berlin, 1846," shows that the result obtained was only external; and though we do not desire to be understood as denying or refusing to this class the possession of a mind *in potentia*, it appears in them to be confined to an embryonic state.—

III.

The Form of Education.

§ 23. The general form of Education is determined by the nature of the mind, that it really is nothing but what it makes itself to be. The mind is (1) immediate (or potential), but (2) it must estrange itself from itself as it were, so that it may place itself over against itself as a special object of attention; (3) this estrangement is finally removed through a further acquaintance with the object—it feels itself at home in that on which it looks, and returns again enriched to the form of immediateness. That which at first appeared to be another than itself is now seen to be itself. Education cannot create; it can only help to develop to reality the previously existent possibility; it can only help to bring forth to light the hidden life.

§ 24. All culture, whatever may be its special purport, must pass through these two stages—of estrangement, and its removal. Culture must hold fast to the distinction between the subject and the object considered immediately, though it has again to absorb this distinction into itself, in order that the union of the two may be more complete and lasting. The subject recognizes then all the more certainly that what at

first appeared to it as a foreign existence, belongs to it as its own property, and that it holds it as its own all the more by means of culture.

—Plato, as is known, calls the feeling with which knowledge must begin, wonder; but this can serve as a beginning only, for wonder itself can only express the tension between the subject and the object at their first encounter—a tension which would be impossible if they were not in themselves identical. Children have a longing for the far-off, the strange, and the wonderful, as if they hoped to find in these an explanation of themselves. They want the object to be a genuine object. That to which they are accustomed, which they see around them every day, seems to have no longer any objective energy for them; but an alarm of fire, banditti life, wild animals, gray old ruins, the robin's songs, and far-off happy islands, &c.—everything high-colored and dazzling—leads them irresistibly on. The necessity of the mind's making itself foreign to itself is that which makes children prefer to hear of the adventurous journeys of Sinbad than news of their own city or the history of their nation, and in youth this same necessity manifests itself in their desire of travelling.—

§ 25. This activity of the mind in allowing itself to be absorbed, and consciously so, in an object with the purpose of making it his own, or of producing it, is *Work*. But when the mind gives itself up to its objects as chance may present them or through arbitrariness, careless as to whether they have any result, such activity is *Play*. Work is laid out for the pupil by his teacher by authority, but in his play he is left to himself.

§ 26. Thus work and play must be sharply distinguished from each other. If one has not respect for work as an important and substantial activity, he not only spoils play for his pupil, for this loses all its charm when deprived of the antithesis of an earnest, set task, but he undermines his respect for real existence. On the other hand, if he does not give him space, time, and opportunity, for play, he prevents the peculiarities of his pupil from developing freely through the exercise of his creative ingenuity. Play sends the pupil back refreshed to his work, since in play he forgets himself

in his own way, while in work he is required to forget himself in a manner prescribed for him by another.

—Play is of great importance in helping one to discover the true individualities of children, because in play they may betray thoughtlessly their inclinations. This antithesis of work and play runs through the entire life. Children anticipate in their play the earnest work of after life; thus the little girl plays with her doll, and the boy pretends he is a soldier and in battle.—

§ 27. Work should never be treated as if it were play, nor play as if it were work. In general, the arts, the sciences, and productions, stand in this relation to each other: the accumulation of stores of knowledge is the recreation of the mind which is engaged in independent creation, and the practice of arts fills the same office to those whose work is to collect knowledge.

§ 28. Education seeks to transform every particular condition so that it shall no longer seem strange to the mind or in anywise foreign to its own nature. This identity of consciousness, and the special character of anything done or endured by it, we call Habit [habitual conduct or behavior]. It conditions formally all progress; for that which is not yet become habit, but which we perform with design and an exercise of our will, is not yet a part of ourselves.

§ 29. As to Habit, we have to say next that it is at first indifferent as to what it relates. But that which is to be considered as indifferent or neutral cannot be defined in the abstract, but only in the concrete, because anything that is indifferent as to whether it shall act on these particular men, or in this special situation, is capable of another or even of the opposite meaning for another man or men for the same men or in other circumstances. Here, then, appeal must be made to the individual conscience in order to be able from the depths of individuality to separate what we can permit to ourselves from that which we must deny ourselves. The aim of Education must be to arouse in the pupil this spiritual and ethical sensitiveness which does not recognize anything as merely indifferent, but rather knows how to seize in everything, even in the seemingly small, its universal human significance. But in relation to the highest problems he

must learn that what concerns his own immediate personality is entirely indifferent.

§ 30. Habit lays aside its indifference to an external action through reflection on the advantage or disadvantage of the same. Whatever tends as a harmonious means to the realization of an end is advantageous, but that is disadvantageous which, by contradicting its idea, hinders or destroys it. Advantage and disadvantage being then only *relative* terms, a habit which is advantageous for one man in one case may be disadvantageous for another man, or even for the same man, under different circumstances. Education must, therefore, accustom the youth to judge as to the expediency or inexpediency of any action in its relation to the essential vocation of his life, so that he shall avoid that which does not promote its success.

§ 31. But the *absolute* distinction of habit is the moral distinction between the good and the bad. For from this stand-point alone can we finally decide what is allowable and what is forbidden, what is advantageous and what is disadvantageous.

§ 32. As relates to form, habit may be either passive or active. The passive is that which teaches us to bear the vicissitudes of nature as well as of history with such composure that we shall hold our ground against them, being always equal to ourselves, and that we shall not allow our power of acting to be paralyzed through any mutations of fortune. Passive habit is not to be confounded with obtuseness in receiving impressions, a blank abstraction from the affair in hand which at bottom is found to be nothing more than a selfishness which desires to be left undisturbed; it is simply composure of mind in view of changes over which we have no control. While we vividly experience joy and sorrow, pain and pleasure—inwoven as these are with the change of seasons, of the weather, &c.—with the alternation of life and death, of happiness and misery, we ought nevertheless to harden ourselves against them so that at the same time in our consciousness of the supreme worth of the mind we shall build up the inaccessible stronghold of Freedom in ourselves.—Active habit [or behavior] is found realized in a wide range of activity which appears in manifold forms, such as skill,

dexterity, readiness of information, &c. It is a steeling of the internal for action upon the external, as the Passive is a steeling of the internal against the influences of the external.

§ 33. Habit is the general form which instruction takes. For since it reduces a condition or an activity within ourselves to an instinctive use and wont, it is necessary for any thorough instruction. But as, according to its content, it may be either proper or improper, advantageous or disadvantageous, good or bad, and according to its form may be the assimilation of the external by the internal, or the impress of the internal upon the external, Education must procure for the pupil the power of being able to free himself from one habit and to adopt another. Through his freedom he must be able not only to renounce any habit formed, but to form a new one; and he must so govern his system of habits that it shall exhibit a constant progress of development into greater freedom. We must discipline ourselves, as a means toward the ever-changing realization of the Good in us, constantly to form and to break habits.

—We must characterize those habits as bad which relate only to our convenience or our enjoyment. They are often not blamable in themselves, but there lies in them a hidden danger that they may allure us into luxury or effeminacy. But it is a false and mechanical way of looking at the affair if we suppose that a habit which has been formed by a certain number of repetitions can be broken by an equal number of denials. We can never renounce a habit utterly except through a clearness of judgment which decides it to be undesirable, and through firmness of will.—

§ 34. Education comprehends also the reciprocal action of the opposites, authority and obedience, rationality and individuality, work and play, habit and spontaneity. If we imagine that these can be reconciled by rules, it will be in vain that we try to restrain the youth in these relations. But a failure in education in this particular is very possible through the freedom of the pupil, through special circumstances, or through the errors of the educator himself. And for this very reason any theory of Education must take into account in the beginning this negative possibility. It must consider beforehand the dangers which threaten the pupil in all possible

ways even before they surround him, and fortify him against them. Intentionally to expose him to temptation in order to prove his strength, is devilish ; and, on the other hand, to guard him against the chance of dangerous temptation, to wrap him in cotton (as the proverb says), is womanish, ridiculous, fruitless, and much more dangerous ; for temptation comes not alone from without, but quite as often from within, and secret inclination seeks and creates for itself the opportunity for its gratification, often perhaps an unnatural one. The truly preventive activity consists not in an abstract seclusion from the world, all of whose elements are innate in each individual, but in the activity of knowledge and discipline, modified according to age and culture.

—If one endeavors to deprive the youth of all free and individual intercourse with the world, one only falls into a continual watching of him, and the consciousness that he is watched destroys in him all elasticity of spirit, all confidence, all originality. The police shadow of control obscures all independence and systematically accustoms him to dependence. As the tragi-comic story of Peter Schlemihls shows, one cannot lose his own shadow without falling into the saddest fatalities ; but the shadow of a constant companion, as in the pedagogical system of the Jesuits, undermines all naturalness. And if one endeavors too strictly to guard against that which is evil and forbidden, the intelligence of the pupils reacts in deceit against such efforts, till the educators are amazed that such crimes as come often to light can have arisen under such careful control.—

§ 35. If there should appear in the youth any decided moral deformity which is opposed to the ideal of his education, the instructor must at once make inquiry as to the history of its origin, because the negative and the positive are very closely connected in his being, so that what appears to be negligence, rudeness, immorality, foolishness, or oddity, may arise from some real needs of the youth which in their development have only taken a wrong direction.

§ 36. If it should appear on such examination that the negative action was only a product of wilful ignorance, of caprice, or of arbitrariness on the part of the youth, then this calls for a simple prohibition on the part of the educator, no

reason being assigned. His authority must be sufficient to the pupil without any reason. Only when this has happened more than once, and the youth is old enough to understand, should the prohibition, together with the reason therefor, be given.

—This should, however, be brief; the explanation must retain its disciplinary character, and must not become extended into a doctrinal essay, for in such a case the youth easily forgets that it was his own misbehavior which was the occasion of the explanation. The statement of the reason must be honest, and it must present to the youth the point most easy for him to seize. False reasons are morally blamable in themselves, and they tend only to confuse. It is a great mistake to unfold to the youth the broadening consequences which his act may bring. These uncertain possibilities seem to him too powerless to affect him particularly. The severe lecture wearies him, especially if it be stereotyped, as is apt to be the case with fault-finding and talkative instructors. But more unfortunate is it if the painting of the gloomy background to which the consequences of the wrong-doing of the youth may lead, should fill his feelings and imagination prematurely with gloomy fancies, because then the representation has led him one step toward a state of wretchedness which in the future man may become fearful depression and degradation.—

§ 37. If the censure is accompanied with a threat of punishment, then we have the same kind of reproof which in daily life we call "scolding;" but if reproof is given, the pupil must be made to feel that it is in earnest.

§ 38. Only when all other efforts have failed, is punishment, which is the real negation of the error, the transgression, or the vice, justifiable. Punishment inflicts intentionally pain on the pupil, and its object is, by means of this sensation, to bring him to reason, a result which neither our simple prohibition, our explanation, nor our threat of punishment, has been able to reach. But the punishment, as such, must not refer to the subjective totality of the youth, or his disposition in general, but only to the act which, as result, is a manifestation of the disposition. It acts meditately on the disposition, but leaves the inner being untouched directly; and

this is not only demanded by justice, but on account of the sophistry that is inherent in human nature, which desires to assign to a deed many motives, it is even necessary.

§ 39. Punishment as an educational means is nevertheless essentially corrective, since, by leading the youth to a proper estimation of his fault and a positive change in his behavior, it seeks to improve him. At the same time it stands as a sad indication of the insufficiency of the means previously used. On no account should the youth be frightened from the commission of a misdemeanor, or from the repetition of his negative deed through fear of punishment—a system which leads always to terrorism: but, although it may have this effect, it should, before all things, impress upon him the recognition of the fact that the negative is not allowed to act as it will without limitation, but rather that the Good and the True have the absolute power in the world, and that they are never without the means of overcoming anything that contradicts them.

—In the statute-laws, punishment has the opposite office. It must first of all satisfy justice, and only after this is done can it attempt to improve the guilty. If a government should proceed on the same basis as the educator it would mistake its task, because it has to deal with adults, whom it elevates to the honorable position of responsibility for their own acts. The state must not go back to the psychological ethical genesis of a negative deed. It must assign to a secondary rank of importance the biographical moment which contains the deed in process and the circumstances of a mitigating character, and it must consider first of all the deed in itself. It is quite otherwise with the educator; for he deals with human beings who are relatively undeveloped, and who are only growing toward responsibility. So long as they are still under the care of a teacher, the responsibility of their deed belongs in part to him. If we confound the standpoint in which punishment is administered in the state with that in education, we work much evil.—

§ 40. Punishment as a negation of a negation, considered as an educational means, cannot be determined *a priori*, but must always be modified by the peculiarities of the individual offender and by the peculiar circumstances. Its administra-

tion calls for the exercise of the ingenuity and tact of the educator.

§ 41. Generally speaking, we must make a distinction between the sexes, as well as between the different periods of youth; (1) some kind of corporal punishment is most suitable for children, (2) isolation for older boys and girls, and (3) punishment based on the sense of honor for young men and women.

§ 42. (1) Corporal punishment is the production of physical pain. The youth is generally whipped, and this kind of punishment, provided always that it is not too often administered or with undue severity, is the proper way of dealing with wilful defiance, with obstinate carelessness, or with a really perverted will, so long or so often as the higher perception is closed against appeal. The imposing of other physical punishment, e.g. that of depriving the pupil of food, partakes of cruelty. The view which sees in the rod the panacea for all the teacher's embarrassments is censurable, but equally undesirable is the false sentimentality which assumes that the dignity of humanity is affected by a blow given to a child, and confounds self-conscious humanity with child-humanity, to which a blow is the most natural form of reaction, in which all other forms of influence at last end.

—The fully-grown man ought never to be whipped, because this kind of punishment reduces him to the level of the child, and, when it becomes barbarous, to that of a brute animal, and so is absolutely degrading to him. In the English schools the rod is much used. If a pupil of the first class be put back into the second at Eton, he, although before exempt from flogging, becomes liable to it. But however necessary this system of flogging of the English aristocracy may be in the discipline of their schools, flogging in the English army is a shameful thing for the free people of Great Britain.—

§ 43. (2) By Isolation we remove the offender temporarily from the society of his fellows. The boy left alone, cut off from all companionship, and left absolutely to himself, suffers from a sense of helplessness. The time passes heavily, and soon he is very anxious to be allowed to return to the company of parents, brothers and sisters, teachers and fellow-pupils.

—To leave a child entirely to himself without any supervision, even if one shuts him up in a dark room, is as mistaken a practice as to leave a few together without supervision, as is too often done where they are kept after school, when they give the freest rein to their childish wantonness and commit the wildest pranks.—

§ 44. (3) This way of isolating a child does not touch his sense of honor at all, and is soon forgotten because it relates to only one side of his conduct. It is quite different from punishment based on the sense of honor, which, in a formal manner, shuts the youth out from companionship because he has attacked the principle which holds society together, and for this reason can no longer be considered as belonging to it. Honor is the recognition of one individual by others as their equal. Through his error, or it may be his crime, he has simply made himself unequal to them, and in so far has separated himself from them, so that his banishment from their society is only the outward expression of the real isolation which he himself has brought to pass in his inner nature, and which he by means of his negative act only betrayed to the outer world. Since the punishment founded on the sense of honor affects the whole ethical man and makes a lasting impression upon his memory, extreme caution is necessary in its application lest a permanent injury be inflicted upon the character. The idea of his perpetual continuance in disgrace, destroys in a man all aspiration for improvement.

—Within the family this feeling of honor cannot be so actively developed, because every member of it is bound to every other immediately by natural ties, and hence is equal to every other. Within its sacred circle, he who has isolated himself is still beloved, though it may be through tears. However bad may be the deed he has committed, he is never given up, but the deepest sympathy is felt for him because he is still brother, father, &c. But first in the contact of one family with another, and still more in the contact of an individual with any institution which is founded not on natural ties, but is set over against him as a distinct object, this feeling of honor appears. In the school, and in the matter of ranks and classes in a school, this is very important.—

§ 45. It is important to consider well this gradation of punishment (which, starting with sensuous physical pain, passes through the external teleology of temporary isolation up to the idealism of the sense of honor), both in relation to the different ages at which they are appropriate and to the training which they bring with them. Every punishment must be considered merely as a means to some end, and, in so far, as transitory. The pupil must always be deeply conscious that it is very painful to his instructor to be obliged to punish him. This pathos of another's sorrow for the sake of his cure which he perceives in the mien, in the tone of the voice, in the delay with which the punishment is administered, will become a purifying fire for his soul.

III.

The Limits of Education.

§ 46. The form of Education reaches its limits with the idea of punishment, because this is the attempt to subsume the negative reality and to make it conformable to its positive idea. But the limits of Education are found in the idea of its nature, which is to fashion the individual into theoretical and practical rationality. The authority of the Educator at last becomes imperceptible, and it passes over into advice and example, and obedience changes from blind conformity to free gratitude and attachment. Individuality wears off its rough edges, and is transfigured into the universality and necessity of Reason without losing in this process its identity. Work becomes enjoyment, and he finds his play in a change of activity. The youth takes possession of himself, and can be left to himself.

—There are two widely differing views with regard to the limits of Education. One lays great stress on the weakness of the pupil and the power of the teacher. According to this view, Education has for its province the entire formation of the youth. The despotism of this view often manifests itself where large numbers are to be educated together, and with very undesirable results, because it assumes that the individual pupil is only a specimen of the whole, as if the school were a great factory where each piece of goods is to be stamped exactly like all the rest. Individuality is reduced

by the tyranny of such despotism to one uniform level till all originality is destroyed, as in cloisters, barracks, and orphan asylums, where only one individual seems to exist. There is a kind of Pedagogy also which fancies that one can thrust into or out of the individual pupil what one will. This may be called a superstitious belief in the power of Education.—The opposite extreme disbelieves this, and advances the policy which lets alone and does nothing, urging that individuality is unconquerable, and that often the most careful and far-sighted education fails of reaching its aim in so far as it is opposed to the nature of the youth, and that this individuality has made of no avail all efforts toward the obtaining of any end which was opposed to it. This representation of the fruitlessness of all pedagogical efforts engenders an indifference towards it which would leave, as a result, only a sort of vegetation of individuality growing at hap-hazard.—

§ 47. *The limit of Education is (1) a Subjective one*, a limit made by the individuality of the youth. This is a definite limit. Whatever does not exist in this individuality as a possibility cannot be developed from it. Education can only lead and assist; it cannot create. What Nature has denied to a man, Education cannot give him any more than it is able, on the other hand, to annihilate entirely his original gifts, although it is true that his talents may be suppressed, distorted, and measurably destroyed. But the decision of the question in what the real essence of any one's individuality consists can never be made with certainty till he has left behind him his years of development, because it is then only that he first arrives at the consciousness of his entire self; besides, at this critical time, in the first place, much knowledge only superficially acquired will drop off; and again, talents, long slumbering and unsuspected, may first make their appearance. Whatever has been forced upon a child in opposition to his individuality, whatever has been only driven into him and has lacked receptivity on his side, or a rational ground on the side of culture, remains attached to his being only as an external ornament, a foreign outgrowth which enfeebles his own proper character.

—We must distinguish from that affectation which arises through a misunderstanding of the limit of individuality, the

way which many children and young persons have of supposing when they see models finished and complete in grown persons, that they themselves are endowed by Nature with the power to develop into the same. When they see a reality which corresponds to their own possibility, the presentation of a like or a similar attainment moves them to an imitation of it as a model personality. This may be sometimes carried so far as to be disagreeable or ridiculous, but should not be too strongly censured, because it springs from a positive striving after culture, and needs only proper direction.—

§ 48. (2) *The Objective limit of Education* lies in the means which can be appropriated for it. That the talent for a certain culture shall be present is certainly the first thing; but the cultivation of this talent is the second, and no less necessary. But how much cultivation can be given to it extensively and intensively depends upon the means used, and these again are conditioned by the material resources of the family to which each one belongs. The greater and more valuable the means of culture which are found in a family are, the greater is the immediate advantage which the culture of each one has at the start. With regard to many of the arts and sciences this limit of education is of great significance. But the means alone are of no avail. The finest educational apparatus will produce no fruit where corresponding talent is wanting, while on the other hand talent often accomplishes incredible feats with very limited means, and, if the way is only once open, makes of itself a centre of attraction which draws to itself with magnetic power the necessary means. The moral culture of each one is however, fortunately from its very nature, out of the reach of such dependence.

—In considering the limit made by individuality we recognize the side of truth in that indifference which considers Education entirely superfluous, and in considering the means of culture we find the truth in the other extreme of pedagogical despotism, which fancies that it can command whatever culture it chooses for any one without regard to his individuality.—

§ 49. (3) *The Absolute limit of Education* is the time when the youth has apprehended the problem which he has to

solve, has learned to know the means at his disposal, and has acquired a certain facility in using them. The end and aim of Education is the emancipation of the youth. It strives to make him self-dependent, and as soon as he has become so it wishes to retire and to be able to leave him to the sole responsibility of his actions. To treat the youth after he has passed this point of time still as a youth, contradicts the very idea of Education, which idea finds its fulfilment in the attainment of majority by the pupil. Since the accomplishment of education cancels the original inequality between the educator and the pupil, nothing is more oppressing, nay, revolting to the latter than to be prevented by a continued dependence from the enjoyment of the freedom which he has earned.

—The opposite extreme of the protracting of Education beyond its proper time is necessarily the undue hastening of the Emancipation.—The question whether one is prepared for freedom has been often opened in politics. When any people have gone so far as to ask this question themselves, it is no longer a question whether that people are prepared for it, for without the consciousness of freedom this question would never have occurred to them.—

§ 50. Although educators must now leave the youth free, the necessity of further culture for him is still imperative. But it will no longer come directly through them. Their pre-arranged, pattern-making work is now supplanted by self-education. Each sketches for himself an ideal to which in his life he seeks to approximate every day.

—In the work of self-culture one friend can help another by advice and example; but he cannot educate, for education presupposes inequality.—The necessities of human nature produce societies in which equals seek to influence each other in a pedagogical way, since they establish by certain steps of culture different classes. They presuppose Education in the ordinary sense. But they wish to bring about Education in a higher sense, and therefore they veil the last form of their ideal in the mystery of secrecy.—To one who lives on contented with himself and without the impulse toward self-culture, unless his unconcern springs from his belonging to a savage state of society, the Germans give the name of Philistine, and he is always repulsive to the student who is intoxicated with an ideal.

LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW.

By JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING.

I.

*An Introduction to Philosophy in General.**

GENTLEMEN:—My first word must be one of apology. That an individual who is not a lawyer should address a distinguished society of lawyers, and on their own science, has that in it—in direct statement at least—to suggest only audacity and presumption. This I have felt from the first; and I have, all along, experienced a genuine reluctance to accept this place. Nevertheless, you yourselves have so willed it, and I have simply obeyed. I comfort myself with the thought, too, that it is not strictly into law that I am required to go, but rather into philosophy, though only so far as philosophy has legal bearings. I comfort myself, moreover, with this other circumstance—that, viewing the state of your information in this connection, whether private or public, I shall not be expected by you to handle this subject *proprio Marte*, but by the aid of another or others. Indeed, I may say at once that the result of my examination of a goodly pile of books, supplied to me by your own courtesy, was to convince me that not only was Hegel's statement the most valuable in itself, but that all the others of any importance were so saturated with it as to be unintelligible without its intelligence. The production of this intelligence, besides, is one of the most important things that at the present moment requires to be effected, at the same time that it is one in which my own slight ability is as likely to be serviceable as in any other, perhaps. The philosophy of law, then, which I shall exhibit to you is that which has been presented in full detail by Hegel in the separate volume expressly published by himself, and named “Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, or Natural Right and Political Science in Ground Plan”—constituting, as I believe, the most valuable product of its author. Of the rest—Trendelenburg, Röder, Hildenbrand, Heron, Austin, and all the

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others—I hope to be able to say a word before concluding. Let me recommend to you *now* only Hildenbrand, a work most accurate, most elegant, yet most easy, though steeped withal in the light of Hegel—a work, too, that shames our English books on the subject into impotent beggary.

My situation, then, gentlemen, before you is a somewhat peculiar one; and when I refer to it now, and all it implies, together with certain other circumstances of time, number, &c., known to some of you, as bearing on the composition of these lectures themselves, I wish to be understood as suggesting a few considerations in appeal to your indulgence, and I have no doubt that, with your well-trained minds, they will very readily be taken—*ad avisandum*.

It is my duty now, then, so far as my ability permits, to make you acquainted with the Philosophy of Right in the compass and character in which it presents itself, in its own place, within the system of Hegel. But that, as these very words suggest, entails some consideration of the system itself in which it is imbedded, and of which it forms a part; for only through a sufficient conception of that, the whole, with which it is in connection, and from which it rises, can we ever hope to arrive at an adequate knowledge of this, the part. Besides, it is an affair of common knowledge as regards Hegel, that, in his expositions, no matter presents itself which is not the product of his peculiar dialectic, at the same time that that dialectic itself takes origin from a single principle. A preliminary word, then, will be necessary on the general system of Hegel, its dialectic, and principle. In short, I fear I shall be necessitated to disclose to you—the “Secret of Hegel.” Now, do not for a moment fear, however, that I am going to inflict on you anything very detailed or very abstruse. Whatever I shall tell you shall be very short, and very plain, and, after all, perhaps, no such tax on your attention. The possibility of this, of course, may—and very excusably, perhaps—be doubted. For example, it is told of one of my best friends that, a gentleman finding him occupied with my work on Hegel, and inquiring what he thought of “the Secret,” he answered, “Why, I think the author has *kept* it!” I believe I saw from the papers too, lately, that some gentleman, examined somewhere as to the state of philosophy

at Oxford, and asked particularly as to whether the Hegelianism supposed to be there now prevalent was in any way due to the "Secret of Hegel," had boldly answered—"No; that book only makes the dark darker!" I fain hope there may be mercy for this gentleman; but, in view of the state of conscience he must yet come to, I really am tempted to believe that he will have a great fear in the end of going to—a very bad place!

But, joking apart, the "Secret" of Hegel is once for all open, and there need be no such very great difficulty in its regard—hard though Hegel may be to *read* after revelation of every secret. It appears to me that Mr. Lewes himself has at last found this to be the case. Not that I believe him yet truly to *judge* Hegel; but in the re-written article "Hegel," of the new edition of his "History of Philosophy," just published, he will be found to quote from my work on Hegel at least one passage in which it appears to me the *Secret* is very fairly named.

But, be all that as it may, I think I shall have no difficulty in finding, in characterization of the general procedure of Hegel, the short preliminary word we require here.

If it is possible to shut up Kant in a sentence, it is equally possible, in a sentence, to shut up Hegel. But Kant *has* been so shut up, and, as I believe, more than once. Here, from the "Note" on Kant in the second and third editions of the translation of Schwegler, is what I consider one such sentence: "The sensations of the various special senses, received into the universal *a priori* forms of space and time, are reduced into perceptive objects, connected together in a synthesis of experience, by the categories." Those who do not understand such phrases as "universal *a priori* forms," "perceptive objects," "synthesis of experience," "categories," &c., will probably know just as little of Kant *after* this sentence as they did *before* it. Nevertheless, that is no impeachment of the truth of the assertion that this sentence *does* contain all the broad outlines of the *cognitive* theory of Kant; and perhaps a word or two of explanation will demonstrate this—an explanation which I hope you will presently find to be in place. We can all fancy an ego, an I—fancy it as a unit or unity, as the primal unit, the primal unity. Well, to feel,

to know, this unit must be, so to speak, *charged* with something, an *object*. Now this object, whatever it be, has parts ; it possesses a certain breadth ; it is, as compared with the unit into which it is received, a complex, a manifold ; and it is by connecting the various units of this manifold to each other and to itself that the primal unit or unity, the ego or I, can come to possess, or, what is the same thing, to *know* an object. In an act of cognition, the primal unit, the I, then, reduces into its own unity the plurality of some manifold or object given to it. But the I does not effect this its function of unity, its uniting power, only in a single way. The I is strictly judgment, or the *I in act* is strictly judgment ; and judgment, as we know from logic, has twelve subordinate forms or functions, which functions are arranged by threes under the more general functions of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. We see now, then, the general constitution of the subjective factor in an act of knowledge, of what concerns the I as I. As regards the other factor in the same act, the object again, it is always a *many* or manifold of special sense in space and time. Now, as for space and time, they are (to Kant) neither notions nor sensations ; not the latter (sensations), for they are not due to any special sense, and they have not objects like other special sensations ; and not the former (notions), for, viewed in the relation of wholes and parts, they are seen to have the constitution, not of something intellectually or logically understood, but of something sensuously perceived. Time and space, then, Kant reasons, being neither notions nor sensations, and being at the same time universal and necessary, must be pronounced general perceptive forms, *a priori*, or native to the mind, and lying in the mind from the first as necessary pre-conditions of special sense. This last—special sense—again, is, in all its forms, a mere affection of the subject exposed to the object. For, in all cases, an unknown object, or, as Kant calls it, a transcendental object, is to be supposed to act on special sense and excite the correspondent subjective affection. Here now, then, we have a view of Kant's whole world ; so far, at least, as cognition is concerned. There are the various affections of the various special senses (colors, feels, &c.) ; these are received into the general perceptive forms of space and time ; and, finally, through the

twelve different categorical modes of it, they are reduced into the unity of self-consciousness, or the ego. Should I repeat the sentence, and say now, then, "the sensations of the various special senses, received into the universal *a priori* forms of space and time, are reduced into perceptive objects, connected together in a synthesis of experience, by the categories," I think it will perhaps be less difficult for you to realize what is meant by Kant's *cognitive* theory being shut up in it.

As for Hegel, we must understand him to have started from these constructions of Kant, and only to have modified them. To him Kant's great want was that of *process*, process deductive, process interconnective. Starting with the I, the ego, he (Hegel) would have, like Fichte, the whole foison of the universe derived from its one primal and, so to speak, constitutive act. Accordingly, it is not enough for Hegel to take up, like Kant, abstract logic as it presents itself, and say, there are twelve classes of logical judgment, and these represent twelve functions of unity in self-consciousness, or the ego. Hegel must see the ego develop out of its own self, according to its own law, according to its own rhythm, according to its own principle, according to its own special, original, and primitive nature—develop into the entire system of its own constituent *inner* furniture or contents. And in this we see, too, how Hegel differs from Fichte. Fichte assumes a sort of *external* law of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, according to which he *externally* develops the ego into its own constitutive variety. Hegel will have nothing to do with such *externality* of procedure; he must see the ego unfolding itself into its native variety, according to its own native principle, according to its own inner nature.

Well then, having accomplished this—and you are simply to consider it done—having developed the ego, by its own law, into its own inner contents, Hegel will not, like Kant, only conceive it endowed further with two subjective perceptive forms, two subjective cones of projection, and a variety of special sensational affections, which, received into and externalized by these cones, becomes reduced by the categories, or functional unities of the ego, into the innumerable special objects, and the one system, of experience. No; that is for

him still external, and still arbitrary procedure; it is for him unwarranted procedure, which he must reject; and he conceives instead, after the internal process has reached its full sum, the same law to continue, and externalization of the whole internal sum to be the next result—externalization, that is, into this outward world of things. There is *Nous* to Hegel, thought, which, in obedience to its own law, involved into its own *inner* constituent sum; is further, in obedience to the same law, evolved into its own *outer* constituent sum, and that is the formed universe as it exists around us. In relation to Kant, then, it is to shut up Hegel in a single sentence to say he conceives the ego to develop into its own categories, and these being complete, externalization to result from the same common law. Still Hegel, unlike Kant, thinks not of the particular ego—yours and mine—in this process, but of the universal ego. So, to him, the ego completed in its own inner, is *Nous*, thought, universal self-consciousness—God, “as He is in His eternal essence before the creation of nature or any finite spirit.” This is fairly the amount of the pretension of Hegel when he so describes his logic as such “exposition” (*Darstellung*) of God. But, this being the case, then God’s universe to Hegel is plainly but the *contre-coup*—the counter-stroke of God’s own inner nature. This universe is only to him in externality what God is in internality, or it is in externality only what *self-consciousness* is in internality.

These, then, are the leading ideas of these two men, Kant and Hegel, so far as *theory*, or *cognition*, is concerned; and if one sees in them great similarity, one sees in them also great difference. In Kant’s world there is no knowledge of any *noumenal* existence. Although he postulates things in themselves—that is, independent outer objects—to set up the affections of sense in us, these affections (only further manipulated from within) alone constitute for him all that can be called things. And though he postulates a *logical* unity for self-consciousness, he *knows* no *existential* unity to correspond to the word *soul*: what we call our affections from within, as well as what we call our affections from without, are only *phenomenally* known. In fact, all that Kant knows are phenomenal affections, phenomenally projected into optical spectra of externality, and then *logically* gathered in into

unities again. Whether as regards the subject or as regards the object, he is quite destitute of any noumenal knowledge. *Without* is but sensation, *within* is but sensation; both are but stretched on two spectral skeletons, time and space, to be construed thence into what is called *experience*. The logical element is the only one in Kant that seems to possess any noumenal character, and that, too, rather in reference to *validity* than to *existence*. There is room in Kant—that is, for attaching to his logical element the character of noumenal or objective *validity*, but scarcely that of noumenal or objective *existence*; for self-consciousness being only logical in his eyes, his whole logical element is left without any substantial basis of support—unless in the mere postulate of an *inner* thing in itself, as there is a postulate of *outer* things in themselves. Now Hegel, though starting from these ideas, and deeply influenced by the importance of the logical element, still arrives in the end at a construction very different. The ego is not phenomenal to him, but noumenal; then the furniture of the ego is not limited to these twelve categories, but develops, and with rigorous necessity in every step, into a vast rich system. The spectral perceptive forms of space and time again do not exist for him in that character: they are the universals of externality, but externality to him is necessary, objective, and actual. These, then, are great improvements on the scheme of Kant, and there results a theory which, supplied with an actually external time and space, and an actually external world, is not repugnant to common sense. It is in his conception of externality and externalization, indeed, that we have one of the happiest characteristics of Hegel. “God said, Let there be light; and there was light”: the summed internality burst into its accurately correspondent externality: the flash of light was the birth of the universe. Directly we understand Hegel’s dialectic, there is no difficulty at all in *conceiving* internalization as internalization *here*, and externalization as externalization *there*, but both together as mutually complementary cofactors, as correspondent pieces of one whole: they are the counterparts of the single tally. And in that case, also, it is not difficult to understand that all further characters of externality will flow from the very idea of externality as external-

ity. There will be consequently a boundless possibility of outness, a boundless side by side of particulars, all material, but boundlessly *different*. It is but in obedience to the general conception, too, that externality itself is not an absolute chaos; that the shadow of the tree of intellect falls on it, controlling it, and that it returns in circles, narrowing and narrowing, up to the thought, the internality from which it started, or from which it fell. In regard to this Hegelian theory of externalization, I recollect one of our most famous citizens to have exclaimed to me, "I cannot take in all that d—d nonsense. Do you mean to say that thought made granite?" But I really do not see this to be so very difficult: it lies in the fact that in externality as externality there must be boundless material *difference*: granite is simply one of the *differences*. Altogether, I must acknowledge myself to find Hegel's plan of externalization the happiest ever yet proposed—a plan necessary even when we say, as we *do* say, and *must* say, God *made* the world; for it answers the question of *how*—precisely that question how God, how thought, made granite, for example.*

From this account it will be evident, then, that Hegel is an idealist only as Aristotle is an idealist: he, like the Greek,

* The moment the idea of externality *as* externality is seized, the great difficulty will be found at an end. One ought to ask one's self, what *must* the *idea* of externality—what *must* *externality* itself be? Or, suppose you have *internality* completed—an ego, a boundless intussusception of thoughts, all in each other, and through or thorough each other, but all in the same geometrical point—what *must* its externalization—and its externalization is accurately externalization *as* externalization—be? *Its* externalization—it being an *internalization*—must plainly be the opposite of its ownself: whatever internalization *is*, externalization will be *not*; just as darkness and cold *are* precisely what light and heat are *not*. Or, taking it from the other end, we see that *externality* is infinite *out and outness*, infinite *difference*, under infinite *external* necessity (or, what is the same thing here, *contingency*); while *internality* again is, and must be, infinite *in and inness*, infinite *identity*, under infinite *internal* necessity (or, what is the same thing here, *reason*). We can see here, too, the origin and meaning of Hegel's constant words, *negation*, and the *negative*. Externality is the negative of internality. But the former is the particular, while the latter is the universal: therefore the particular is always the negative of the universal. This may serve to show how deeply *logic* enters into *existence*. The same connection finds meaning for Hegel's perpetual *abstract*. Abstraction, in general, is to take any character in isolated self-identity; and that is the same thing as wresting any one *moment* apart from its connection with the rest into isolated self-identity—the work of *understanding*, not *reason*.

would simply reduce all things to *notions*, would simply reduce all things to an ultimate generalization; and for what is ordinarily called *idealism*, he has not only no sympathy, but an absolute contempt. Absolute or objective idealism is to him only *the thinking of the universe*; but subjective idealism is that spurious idealism which would make externality due to the internality of each *particular* subject, and then, for that simple act, take a big air as if it were philosophy. Hegel rejects such conception and such pretension utterly, and he is never tired of telling us so. In effect, it is a very insufficient reflection this, that because a knower can only know within, therefore there is no independent external universe; but that is really the *bulk* of what is called subjective idealism.

There is another side from which the work of Hegel may be regarded. It is that of *explanation in general*, explanation as such. Man may go on as much as he likes in his merely animal capacity, marrying, doing business, journeying here and there, and enjoying his senses in general: he finds always in the end that that is not enough; that he must *think* as well as live and enjoy; above all, that *he must think existence*; that he must inquire why, once for all, *all this is here, why is it, whence is it, whither does it go?* All that may be summed up in the single phrase: he demands *explanation*. Now, of course, there are a great many explanations now-a-days. Since Bacon, and, above all, Newton, there is what is called science. Explanation is sought for as regards the stars, and there is astronomy. Explanation is sought for as regards the atmosphere, and there is electricity, say. Explanation is sought for as regards the constituents of the earth, their inter-relations, their inter-combinations, &c., and there are the sciences of physics, chemistry, and what not. Well, now, all these sciences are explanatory, science in general is an explanation; but these sciences, or science itself, are an explanation *within conditions* (the stars and planets themselves, the air itself)—within condition of the element itself, so to speak, which constitutes their *nidus*. That element, that *nidus*, is simply taken as we find it, and, after every explanation of science in regard to the special laws of it, the questions in general, why, whence, whither? remain

unanswered. These questions in general constitute philosophy. We shall not stop to consider that these "questions in general" constitute religion. We shall confine ourselves to philosophy. Philosophy, then, receives all the explanations of the sciences, of science in general, and, so instructed and prepared, proceeds to put the final question, the questions in general, why, whence, whither? In a word, philosophy demands an explanation of existence as existence. It is all very well to say here, *that* is impossible; that is a demand that, by the very conditions of the case, never can be granted. This is the situation pretty well of general belief at present: there is now a renunciation of metaphysics, there is now a renunciation of religion. This renunciation can never quash the essential need, however. Man is reason, and reason is irrepressible. Reason knows itself the essence of this universe, the essence of existence, and would see itself as it is, in its own grounds, in its own connections, in its own system. In a word, reason demands explanation as explanation. Now, what is that? What is explanation as explanation? And here it is that Hegel steps in. He considers the general nature of the case, and sees how its conditions *must* be. An explanation, to be an explanation, says Hegel, *must* be *so* and *so*. Now, in this he is not singular: all philosophers who *are* philosophers have seen the same thing. The philosophers *before* Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz *after* him, have all, more or less, consciously been led, in their philosophizings, by the same want. It would be easy to illustrate this in the case of all of them. I shall only, with this view, refer to Diogenes the Apolloniate. The object of this philosopher, as represented in the first two or three fragments of his writings collected by Mullach (they occur also in Ritter and Preller), is plainly explanation, explanation as a general problem. As necessary presuppositions to that end, he assumes that there must be a *single first principle*; that this principle must be *indisputable*; that it must be *adequate* to the *entire existent variety*; and that consequently it must possess intelligence —for intelligence in actual fact *is*. Some of his particular expressions, literally translated, are these: "All things that are must be but alterations of one and the same thing, and

therefore the same thing ; for if the things that are now—land and water, and the rest—were different the one from the other, each in its own nature, and were not the same thing variously changed, it would be impossible that they could be mixed together, or bring each other advantage or disadvantage: all things, then, are alterations of one and the same thing—at one time so and another time thus, and they return to the same thing. But this thing must be great, and mighty, and eternal, and immortal, knowing much. For without intelligence it could not be so disposed as to possess *measures* of all things, of winter and summer, and night and day, and rains, and winds, and calms. And, in the same way, whoever considers them will find all other things disposed as beautifully as possible."

There is involved here, as is evident, a sort of *a priori* reasoning; as about the necessity to explanation of a common principle: how could things combine together or act on each other unless they participated in a common principle? that is pretty well the thought throughout. The further thought, too, is that, in view of the evident measure, proportion, rule, design according to which all things are disposed, this common principle can only be thought as intelligent: if there is rule, reflection, calculation in the effect, there must equally be rule, reflection, calculation in the cause. So it was, then, with Diogenes of Apollonia: *before* explaining, he determined the necessities of explaining; and so it was, also, with many of the others; so it was, above all, and in a supreme degree, with Hegel.

Hegel said to himself, or seems to have said to himself, for there is little that is direct in Hegel—he builds his system as a man might build a house, and lets us find out all his thoughts about it for ourselves—I, too, like other philosophers, would like to explain existence; but what does that mean? Evidently, I must find a single principle, a single fact *in* existence, that is adequate to all the phenomena of existence, to all the variety of existence; and this principle, while adequate to all the variety of existence, while competent to reduce into its own *identity* all the *difference* that is, must bring with it its own reason for its own self, its own necessity, its proof that it is, and it alone is, that which could not

not be. This for explanation — ultimate, radical, and all-embracing explanation — is evidently the necessary presupposition. It will plainly never do to *feign* a principle, to *fancy* a principle: the principle must *be*, an actual denizen, an actual thing present in *that which is*. The Red Indian who exclaims of all that he sees, of thunder and lightning, of the gas when it is lit in a theatre possibly, Manou! Manou! does not explain: he only exclaims; he only excites the imagination of his hearers into the vision of a monster, of a creature of fancy, of a mere *Vorstellung*, that is only assumed, or said to have such and such power, to be such and such a cause. It does not explain rain to say there is a spout above the clouds, although there are minds which would find themselves quite contented with such a mere hypothetical image. Such mere hypothetical, *vicarious* image of phantasy is not enough for Hegel, then: he must find in that which actually is an all-fertile, an all-competent single principle. And here we see at once the reason of Hegel's dislike to the infidel god, the Gallic god, *le dieu français* — that *être suprême* of Enlightenment, of the Illumination, that is an empty abstraction, a barren image of phantasy on which all only *is to be* hung. But that is no prejudice to Hegel's prostration before God, before the true God, before that which is the eternal centre and root, and everlasting substance of the world. He really and truly believes in God, but not in god that is only a topical god — a circumscribed, limited, particular something that is fancied up there — an enormous big man in the air that it is not absurd for Lalande the astronomer to try to see with his telescope. He has thought too much for that, he has read too much for that, he knows his catechism too well for that. He knows that God is a Spirit; that we cannot by physical searching find God out, but that we must worship Him in spirit and in truth. To that, at all events, his own words fairly amount.

This apart then, Hegel, believing himself to acknowledge the true God, and averse only to the abstract god of the *Aufklärung*, would find an explanation of all that is in some *actual constituent* of all that is. And that is thought, reason; that is *self-consciousness*. Self-consciousness he finds to be the one aim of existence: all that is, *is*, he finds *only*

for self-consciousness. That is the one purpose of existence. Nature itself is but a gradual and graduated rise up from the dust of the field to the self-consciousness of man. This we can see for ourselves; in the inorganic scale, up and up to the organic, and, in this latter, up and up to man. All is *explained* only when it is converted into thought, only when it is converted into ourselves, only when it is converted into self-consciousness. But if all only *is* for self-consciousness—if all can be converted into self-consciousness—if self-consciousness is the substance and the ultimate of all, then self-consciousness can be regarded as that which *instituted* all, self-consciousness can be regarded as the *prius* of all: all is only there for it, and to be explained into it. In this way it is seen, then, that self-consciousness is the principle of all; in other words, that self-consciousness is the principle of explanation sought. Hegel's work, consequently, is but one of ultimate *generalization*, of ultimate *induction*. *Of actual facts*, he finds self-consciousness the dominant one, the key to, and the *raison d'être* of, all the rest. What follows, then, is that Hegel should apply this key.

Of course, there are many men now-a-days, as I may just stop to remark, who only scorn as futile any such attempt as this of Hegel; and to the sentiments of these men we find from Xenophon that Socrates long ago gave voice and authority. "For he did not, like most of the others, debate of the nature of this all, speculating as to how what the Sophists call the world came into being, and by what necessities the various heavenly bodies were produced and he wondered if it was not evident to these men that it was impossible for man to find out these things." These words occur in the very first chapter of the *Memorabilia*, and there are more beside them to the same effect, with general derision of these high speculative philosophers, who yet, as is further pointed out, with all their claims, have hardly an opinion in common. This the opinion of Socrates is a very decided one, then. Hegel knows it well, too, but he does not let it trouble him. Rather, in direct opposition to Socrates, and to Socrates as praised by Cicero, he boldly exclaims, "Philosophy cannot be worth anything to the lives and homes of men unless it come down from heaven; and it is the one duty left us to

carry it up into heaven." In this, it is certain that, apart from that of Socrates, the highest names can be placed on the side of Hegel. Indeed it is difficult to find a single name on the whole bright file which did not belong to one whose reflection was such as fell within the censure of Socrates. Plato and Aristotle directly followed him; but the favorite speculation of both lay, we may say, *in the heavens*, and this not less in the case of the real Aristotle than in that of the ideal Plato. These names shall suffice, then, for the side of Hegel, and we shall let all the others, modern or ancient, pass. In a word, as I said already, *reason* demands an explanation of existence as existence; and *we must obey reason*.

On the part of Hegel, we shall see now, then, his application of the key of self-consciousness for this purpose. It was by induction, as we saw, that Hegel came to this key. Self-consciousness is in the world of facts, and all these other facts are only for it. It is the ultimate and essential drop of the universe, and explanation is only the reduction of all things into it. All things, indeed, stretch hands to it, rise in successive circles ever nearer and nearer to it. Now, what is self-consciousness? Its constitutive movement is the idealization of a particular through a universal into a singular, or, taking it from the other end, it is the realization of a universal through a particular into a singular. Now that may appear a very hard saying, but it is a very simple one in reality: it is only a general naming of the general act of self-consciousness. In every act of self-consciousness that is, there is an object and a subject. The object on its side is a material externality of parts, while the subject on the other side again is an intellectual unity, but a unity that has within it, or behind it, a whole world of thoughts. It is by these thoughts the subject would master the object, reduce it into itself. These thoughts, then, that thus master the object, are the universals under which it is subsumed, and it, as so subsumed, is but the particular to these universals. The outward world, then, consists only of the particulars of the universals that constitute the inward world. I think this will be readily seen to be true. We can only think by generalizing, and generalizing is the reduction of particulars to universals. Evidently, then, in every act of self-consciousness particulars

meet universals in a singular. We were right, consequently, in describing the constitutive movement of self-consciousness to be the idealization of a particular (the object) through a universal (the thought) into a singular (the subject). When we consider, moreover, that self-consciousness is the original substantial principle, the veritable *prius* of all, we shall see also that it is not incorrect to describe the constitutive movement of self-consciousness as the realization of a universal through a particular into a singular. Now, that is the Notion—that is the Secret of Hegel. *The vital act of self-consciousness is the notion.* The single word *notio* involves all the three elements, a *knowing* (universal) of *something* (particular) in a *knower* (singular). An act of knowing—idealization quite generally—is the reduction of a particular through a universal into a singular; but è *contra*, *creation*—and that is realization quite generally—is the exemplification of a universal to a singular through a particular. This, then, is the one ground-notion which Hegel, by virtue of its own law, its own rhythm, as triple in its own form, and so triple that its units, though *different* from, are yet related to, and *identical* with, each other—this, I say, is the one ground-notion which Hegel sees develop before him out of its own self into the sum of its own *inner* constituent system of notions. That inner system he then calls *idea*. The notion is the first and the ever-present substance—every one of the derivative notions is but *the* notion—but the completed internal system of these notions, or of *the* notion, is *the idea*. The idea now, then, is the entire and complete universal, and it is only in obedience to the one ever-present law that it sunders into the particular—Nature. Nature again, the particular, returns to the universal in the singular, Mind, which gradually rises from its primal involution in nature up through all its forms to the Absolute Spirit.

Universal, particular, and singular, are the three moments of the notion, and everything *organic*, everything *true* in this world is—however abstract its *element*—a *concrete* of these three moments, which can be seen to take on in the course of the development a thousand names, as thesis, antithesis, synthesis; or a form which is a great favorite in my own explanations, simple apprehension, judgment, and reason. This

notion may be illustrated in a variety of ways. What is *organization*, for example—what is an organization to any purpose? Reflect on it as you may, you will find that it is the reduction of a *many* of particulars to the *unity* of a singular through the menstruum of universals—the plan and what it implies. Every concrete is but such organization. The family, for example: there is no perfect family where there is not the *fulfilled idea*, where each of the three moments, universal, particular, and singular, has not full justice accorded it. So the state; a state must be *idea*—perfect harmony of universal, particular, and singular, else it is imperfect and not a state. The state is the accomplished *idea* of the self-developing *notion*; here free-will, and in it, if perfect, each of the *moments*, has its due place and its due scope. But is not the universe itself the best illustration? The universe itself is but the realization of the universal through the particular in the singular; and all that is said when we pronounce the single word—self-consciousness.

Hegel's work now, then, can evidently be called simply the ultimate *generalization*. He sees that if we would ultimately explain, we must fairly generalize explanation itself. Explanation is always the reduction of an object into self-consciousness; ultimate explanation, then, must be a reduction of all into self-consciousness. But self-consciousness is a fact, it is something *in rerum natura*, a principle actually existing: Hegel's work, then, is in so many words the final and universal *induction*.

But you will say, perhaps, the self-consciousness that is in nature is *ours*—there is no other self-consciousness *in nature* than ours: are we to suppose that Hegel views *my* self-consciousness, *your* self-consciousness, *his* self-consciousness, as God? In one way, I cannot deny this. Still Hegel's idealism, as I said already, is no *subjective* idealism: he does not conceive nature to be an externalization of the *individual subject's* categories, notions, but of those of the universal subject, of those of the universal self-consciousness. But Hegel, we might object further, would certainly admit that every individual finite subject might die, and yet the universe would subsist. What in that case were God? Would not Hegel seem simply to conceive then a potential God—a God as it were asleep in

nature—and who had yet to be *realized* afresh in other finite self-consciousness? There are professing adherents of Hegel—Ruge and the so-called party of German critics—who seem to entertain some such conception. I, for my part, admit that such may appear to be the case, so far as Hegel's developments apart from time, apart from history, are concerned; but I assert such an appearance no longer to obtain the moment the development has entered the domain of spirit. In the sphere of religion especially, Hegel, as is well known, sums up his development in Christianity as the revealed religion, and in the midst of numerous expressions that are unmistakably theistic. I may quote here what I said in the newspapers (*Courant*, Dec. 21, 1868) on this head three years ago:—"We are bound to accept Hegel's own professions. Again and again, and in the most emphatic manner, he has asserted himself not only to be politically conservative, but religiously orthodox—a Lutheran Christian. If we accept, as we do, his first assertion without difficulty, we have no right to deny his second. Indeed, however pantheistic the construction, so to speak, in space may appear, the tables, as intimated, are wholly turned in the construction in time, and Hegel ends not only by profession, but by philosophy, a theist and a Christian."

I may say also, that this statement met at the time with the complete approbation of the non-Hegelian Professor Ueberweg—non-Hegelian, but before his death, as both correspondence and actual published writings led me to believe, less and less so. Ueberweg, whose premature death—the premature death of perhaps the most indefatigable philosophical student of his time—we are now justly lamenting, wrote me that his belief was quite mine as expressed in the quotation I have read, and that it was impossible to establish a negative against such a religious claim for Hegel. Of course, it is to be allowed that Hegel *philosophizes* Christianity, and that his understanding of much is not such as John Knox would have accepted. Nevertheless, this is to be said, that Hegel would have claimed accord—*substantially*—even with John Knox. We believe the same historical fact and facts, he would have said; only you see them in the *Vorstellung*, while I see them in the *Begriff*. That at all events is really

the true nature of the case; and it is a piece of wisdom that is much needed at present. That single distinction between Vorstellung and Begriff is fitted to bring about perfect reconciliation between the beliefs of the less educated and those of the more educated, and give the Church peace. I may add, too, that every objection from the religious side that may be taken to the rôle assigned by Hegel to self-consciousness will disappear on due consideration of the text: "In His own image God created man."

Returning again for a moment to the principle of self-consciousness itself, let me point out another advantage possessed by it as a principle of explanation. It contains within itself both *difference* and *identity*, and a little reflection will make it plain that there can be no possible explanation of this world without a principle that contains both elements. The origin of *difference* in *identity* is the point and focus of the whole problem; but we have that at once in self-consciousness. Thought, reason, self-consciousness, is the one single necessity, the primal *avdyxη*, that that could not *not* be, and alone that that could not *not* be; but thought, reason, self-consciousness, is by nature a duplicity in unity, difference in identity, for to know is to be always two things in one; what knows and what is known are for ever different but for ever identical. And so it is that evolution is possible; for, after all, the work of Hegel is certainly an *evolution*. It must be regarded, however, as only a *potential* one, only one *in idea*, not one that takes place or ever took place *in time*. And this gives it a vast superiority over ordinary evolution doctrines. To suppose that there ever was a natural first germ that *naturally grew* into another—as, for example, that the oyster ever *grew* into a man—is to suppose an absurdity. The evolution is—*there—in idea*—and that is really by power of the idea—but it never took place in *natural* fact. All that ingenuity which would explain the peacock's tail by the loves of the female (whose comparative plainness then remains unaccountable) is but perverse and a waste of time—a waste of time in this, too, that science is quite unable to allow the explanation itself *time enough*. It would be easy to bring forward sufficient ingenuity to explain the spider's web—by a drop of accidental fluid accidentally

emitted by some certain spider one fine day, that gave that accidental advantage which is necessary ; but would such ingenuity, such Vorstellung, such mere fancy, be scientific explanation ? The method of *natural conjecture* in fact, however amusing, leads nowhere.

But let us now, in conclusion, just glance at Hegel's evolution that precedes and results in the notion of law, to which all that I have yet said is only preliminary ; and I trust I have your excuse for spending so much time on what is only preliminary, my conviction being that any shorter previous explanation would have been futile. Hegel's system, as is now pretty well known, is contained in three great spheres—the Science of Logic, the Philosophy of Nature, and the Philosophy of Spirit. Here we see at once that what we have before us is the Notion. Logic is the universal, Nature is the particular, and Spirit is the Singular. Logic, having developed into full *Idea*, passes into the particular as the particular, into externalization as externalization, in Nature ; and Nature, rising and collecting itself, through sphere after sphere, from externality itself in the form of space, up to *natural internality* in the form of organic life, passes into Soul, which is the first form of Spirit. The instrument of the evolution all along, we are to understand, is the *Notion* in its three *Moments*. Omitting any closer consideration of the evolution in Logic and Nature—vast wholes of philosophy though they be—we shall pass to that of Spirit ; and here, too, we must be but perfunctory only until we reach our own subject. The three heads under which Spirit is treated are Subjective Spirit, Objective Spirit, and Absolute Spirit—obviously again in agreement with the three moments of the Notion. Under Subjective Spirit we have mind rising *through its own faculties* to its own higher forms—or *the faculties themselves* are represented *but as successive stages* of development in mind itself—and all as ever in obedience to the *notion*. Thus, theoretical spirit, or the spirit that knows, cognition that is, being complete, passes into practical spirit, the spirit that acts, the spirit that has will ; and will can only realize itself in the objective world of Law—in the State. And here we have reached at last our own subject. The introduction has been long, but not longer, I believe, than was

absolutely necessary to enable us to understand the movement of Hegel—that dialectic which we shall find as active in what concerns Right, Law, as elsewhere. Now, however, I think we may consider ourselves fully *instruits*; and at our next meeting we shall effect the transition from the theoretical to the practical spirit, and enter on the objective domain of the latter—on the domain of will, and of law as its realization.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

Translated from the German of J. G. FICHTE, by A. E. KROEGER.

BOOK II.

FACTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN REGARD TO THE PRACTICAL FACULTY.

CHAPTER III.

The Tendency of the Ego to overcome the Check is posited as a Multiplicity of material Bodies, or as a System of Individuals.

That which I actually—that is, in the region of my self-confined power of imaging—produce through my causality is to confine my own external causality, so that no retraction of my thinking can retract its being. Nay, what is more, even the contemplation of other beings like myself is to be bound by it, as likewise by my own bodily existence.

This is here simply my assertion, and presented simply as a mere pure fact of consciousness. Now this assertion involves the following :

1. There do exist outside of myself beings like myself.
2. These beings are bound to recognize me, by virtue of my bodily existence, as a being like themselves.
3. They are also bound to perceive the products of my activity in the material world.

The latter two propositions I may safely take for granted after having assumed the first one. The whole is here represented simply as a fact of consciousness without any deduction or (what our deductions here are) junction with a higher link, since we have here as yet no higher link wherewith we

could bring this fact into conjunction, being as yet busy in the endeavor to get at such a higher link by ascending from our present point. Hence we have at present to see simply what this fact involves; that is, to connect it with what is already known to us, and to comprehend it from that standpoint.

First of all: how do I get at all at that presupposition? How does the picture and the thought of such beings like me outside of myself arise in me? It is not only wonderful but contradictory to all our previous supposition. The life of freedom and of consciousness has hitherto been represented as one; all our deductions have been made from the oneness, and only by its means have we proved and explained. But now this one life evidently dirempts into many lives, which in their essence are to be like each other; hence this one life is here repeated in many forms, and repeated. How does this repetition occur? Don't let us, by any means, ask as yet from what ground it occurs, for that question can probably be answered only in another place; but, through what fact does this positing of other beings outside of us occur?

A.—In order to prepare our investigation, let us once more answer in all possible clearness the oft-answered question: how do I make myself a real principle? As an imaging principle I already have myself, and contemplate myself as such through the immediate internal contemplation of freedom. But, apart from this internal contemplation, I have another form of immediate consciousness, namely, my immediately through-itself-limited productive power of imaging. I attempt to apply also this second form to the Ego contemplated in the first described manner, and I find that this my productive power of imaging is limited by this Ego also immediately and in a two-fold manner, namely, 1st, by that Ego as a material body; and 2d, by the products of that Ego as a material body in a material world.

Have I now, then, completely externalized the Ego, and placed it, through thinking, out of the region of immediate internal contemplation, in the region of external perception? Yes and no. The bodily presentation of the Ego and its causality in the material world are externalized; but the self-determining of this causality, the conception and plan

that precede it, remain as yet mere objects of internal contemplation, and in so far the Ego has not yet been externalized. But that causality, as the external, is conditioned by that self-determining, or by that conception, as the internal, and without an internal we shall never get an external. Hence this Ego gets completely externalized neither by the mere external contemplation or productive thinking, nor by the mere internal contemplation, but only by an absolutely inseparable synthesis of both.

B.—I try still further whether I cannot get this Ego—even beyond this synthesis and precisely as it occurs in this synthesis, namely, as composed of internal and external self-contemplation—by means of productive thinking from the now completed inner contemplation; that is, whether I cannot get hold of it in that purely original thinking, whereby it would—as an absolute giving out of the internal—get utterly cut off from this given internal contemplation, and would receive for the Ego of this internal contemplation an altogether peculiar on-itself-reposing Being; becoming for this Ego a true non-Ego, just as happened in the case of the first product of free thinking, the merely material object of external perception, only in a much higher degree. I say, for the Ego of this hitherto described internal contemplation, although in-and-for-itself it may well be an Ego, since it has been thought as such.

I try and I find that I not only can but must do so. The productive power of imagination in attempting to realize such a thinking finds itself compelled to realize it, that is, finds itself limited by the existence of such external Egos, and moreover—as results from the original form of the power of imaging—by an infinite number of possible Egos. The Ego must be externalized through thinking, and can be so externalized infinitely. Now, in what particular case this conception must be applied and realized we shall have to specify hereafter.

C.—Let us, firstly, consider the form of this original thinking of the Ego, that is, of externalizing. To be sure, the inner Ego is also thought and received into the form of independent Being; it is not thought, however, through the absolute original thinking, but by means of the inner contemplation.

Now that previously described thinking of the mere material object of external perception appeared—at least in our first investigation—as grounded and conditioned through another, through the necessity to draft a conception of the activity which the impulse desires to achieve. Now we have no condition given for the thinking of an Ego beyond the Ego of immediate internal contemplation; we have posited it as an absolute fact. Hence this thinking is, at least here, an altogether unconditioned determination of pure and absolute thinking, and is therefore thought simply because it is thought, and thinking, itself, involves this particular thinking. We cannot say, I think—produce—other Egos; but rather, universal and absolute thinking thinks—or thinkingly produces—those other Egos, and my own Ego amongst them. Hereafter we shall, perhaps, find a ground even of this thinking; but it is already evident here that that ground cannot be of the same nature as the grounds and conditions heretofore.

D.—Let us now proceed to ascertain the contents of this absolute thought. The Ego is thought absolute—precisely as it was generated above through the absolute synthesis of internal and external contemplation, and as the uniting central point of both. Hence the thought Ego receives *internally* its immediate self-contemplation—its faculty of conception, of self-determination, &c.; and *externally* a materially organized body and a possible causality in the material world, precisely as pertains to the first Ego, from which we started in our internal investigation.

Now, the significant part here is this: the immediately internal contemplation is repeated, for the present at least, twice. But these two internal contemplations are separated by an absolute gulf, and neither of them can look into the other, since each one is not contemplated but thought by the other. What is this gulf?

Evidently it is upon this distinction that I base my assertion, this is *my* Ego; and that I admit of my neighbor's Ego, although it is just like mine: this is not mine but his Ego; words that he, speaking of me, repeats in the same manner. Now, what does this duplication of the Ego into my Ego signify here? Evidently it is the basis of the fundamental

character of the individual as such. What, then, is this character?

Just remember how we arrived at all at an Ego. Knowledge reflected itself, and found and seized itself in the act, which act may thus be well called an altogether immediate (and if we have named this internal an external) contemplation. But it was this contemplation which, gathered into the fixed form of thinking, first gave rise to an Ego, first as a knowing intelligence, and next as a principle; and this indeed was the origin of the first and in all our previous investigations single, Ego; nor would any Ego have arisen without that reflection and self-contemplation of knowledge. Hence it follows that the actual existence of an Ego is grounded upon an absolute fact of immediate self-contemplation, namely, the self-contemplation of knowledge.

At present this Ego is to be multiplied; there are to be many Egos. This immediate self-contemplation must, therefore, occur many times; that is, its fact must be multiplied, since every such fact is the ground of an Ego. Vice versa, to say that many Egos are posited, is to say that the fact of inner contemplation is posited as having occurred many times. That knowledge, which is internally contemplated in this fact, may well remain one and the same; for we have neither said, nor does it result from our deduction, that this knowledge is repeated and posited many times. It is simply the altogether seemingly accidental fact of contemplation, or of the reflection of that knowledge, which is posited many times; and it is only thus that a manifold Ego of internal contemplation has first arisen. Now, with this original fact of inner contemplation as its essential birth-place, there connects another Ego, which develops itself as a power of other internal contemplations, of an impulse, of a faculty, of freely-created conceptions. All that further occurs in internal contemplation is gathered into the unity of the Ego thought in virtue of that fact. Thus the Ego of each individual is that Ego which he has thought in virtue of that absolutely primary and original self-contemplation of knowledge which first gave him existence, and to which he now relates all that may occur in the same internal contemplation. Hence the expression, *my* Ego. The Ego which

involves the *my*, and whereof "my" is the adjective, is the absolutely original Ego which has arisen through the immediate fact of self-contemplation. The second Ego, alluded to here, is the progression of the first original Ego in time; and this progression occurring with freedom, and thus remaining under the control of the first original Ego, the original Ego appropriates it as its own and calls it its Ego. Hence that which we have described is the essential character of the individual as such, and through which the spheres of internal contemplation, as based upon separate facts, separate from and mutually exclude each other.

Result: the individuals as such are absolutely separate in themselves, complete single worlds, without any connection whatever.

E.—Now, if we stopped here, life in the background as the matter of the manifold facts of reflection might well remain one and the same, as we have just now maintained; but it could certainly never arrive at a unity, at least in consciousness, since all consciousness would be altogether individual. Indeed it would even remain inexplicable how we, who confess ourselves to be individuals, could think such a unity, though it were simply problematically, and how we could possibly make ourselves understood about the matter. Hence if consciousness is to remain consciousness of the one life, as we have maintained from the first it must, that unity which was cancelled by individuality must be restored in that same consciousness. This must be restored of course; *firstly*, since the inner contemplation is precisely the medium of cancelling the unity by going beyond this medium, by its opposite, which is thinking; and which, since it is a representation of the original and absolute unity, must be an original thinking; and *secondly*, it must be restored just in so far as it is cancelled: that is, those individuals that have been separated into many lives in inner contemplation, must again be united in thinking as such and as remaining such; in other words, they must all occur in the one same thinking.

F.—Consider well what has been said. That thinking, which has as yet been described only factically in its relative form as the opposite of inner contemplation, and hence as a going beyond that contemplation, obtains here, where

its peculiar and inner essence is made apparent, an altogether different and higher significance. It becomes an immediate self-representation of life, as a one and in its unity. Hence it can be only a single thinking, corresponding, and agreeing with itself.

This thinking is the representation or consciousness of life. Hence this thinking must occur everywhere where life enters the form of consciousness. This form it has entered in the individuals. Hence it must occur in these individuals, and, moreover, in all of them. It is in itself one, and must therefore occur in all in the same manner.

I say, the one life represents itself in this thinking in its unity. But the individual as such is not at all life in its unity, but merely a fragment of it. We cannot, therefore, say at all that the individual as such thinks that thinking; or, if we do say so, we must add that it thinks that thinking not as an individual, but as the one and same life. It is in this thinking no longer a particular separate Ego, but the one and universal Ego. After a while we shall arrive at very remarkable applications of this proposition.

If this thinking does occur in the individual, it will appear of course under the condition of free reflection, and not otherwise, in inner contemplation; not as a product of the Ego, however, but simply as the expression of an absolute fact.

Remarks.—The Science of Knowledge has generally been understood as ascribing effects to the individual—for instance, the production of the whole material world, &c.—which cannot at all be ascribed to it. Now, how is the Science of Knowledge, in truth, related to this objection? Thus: those who raised that objection fell into their misunderstanding precisely because they themselves ascribed to the individual far more than appertains to it, and thus committed the very error which they imputed to the Science of Knowledge. Hence, having once misunderstood the first principles of that science, they find that error in it even to a further extent than they themselves are inclined to grant to it. But they are altogether mistaken; it is not the individual, but the one immediate spiritual life, which is the creator of all appearances, and hence also of the appearing individuals. Hence the Science of Knowledge holds so very strictly, that this one life

be thought purely and without any substrate; for the individual serves precisely as such substrate, and hence arise all their errors. Reason—or universal thinking, or knowledge simply—is higher and more than the individual. To be unable to think any other reason than one which an individual possesses as his accident is to be unable to think reason at all. Happy the individual whom reason possesses!

Result: the described absolute thinking represents a community of individuals.

G.—This thinking is expression of life generally, and therefore occurs necessarily wherever life arrives at consciousness. But life arrives at consciousness, as we have said above, in the individuals. It follows, therefore, that *all* actually existing individuals—all points wherein knowledge has arrived at a contemplation of itself—must be necessarily thought from the stand-point of *each* individual. Just as I, individual, think the others, so the others again think me; and as many as I think, so many think me. Thus all think the same community or system of individuals, with this only difference, that each has another starting-point, another sphere of inner contemplation from which he starts. Each one thinks all the others through absolutely original thinking, but he does not think himself so; himself he produces through the described synthesis of both contemplations.

H.—An Ego is necessarily thought as in an organized body. Hence each individual thinks necessarily all the others thus; for Egohoods and organized materiality are absolutely united in original thinking, or in the law of thinking, and hence they are so likewise in actual thinking, or in the following out of that thinking.

Thus the previously first question, as to where the conception of the Ego is applicable in actuality, is here answered as follows: wherever an organized body appears to the external sense, or—as we know better now—to the absolute thinking of a material world. It is not to be understood as if we concluded from the form of the body to the Ego,—neither immediately, for how could such a conclusion from one world to its direct opposite be possible? nor mediately, because I, individual, have such a body, for how can I know that this body is not merely accidental, but belongs essentially and

absolutely to my Ego? But the matter stands thus: both, the thought of the Ego and this bodily representation, are united in the original thinking which expresses life in its unity.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

Translated from the German of Dr. K. ROSENKRANZ, by G. S. HALL.

The conception of history must enter into the system of sciences, although it must be granted that history cannot become strictly a science in the same degree as psychology, logic, etc., because chance and arbitrariness influence the empirical development of Spirit.

The constant elements of history are found in the conception of reason, in the laws of nature, in psychology and ethics. By their necessity alone the actual becomes intelligible. So far as human action is controlled by this necessity, nothing new happens under the sun. We find the family, the community, property, labor, rank, professions, trades, government, laws, customs, and war, among all people and in all ages. Everywhere and in every age we observe the growth and decay of states, of reforms, of revolutions. If all these elements as phenomena were infinitely modified, a science of history would only be still more impossible. What then, in this tumult of facts, is the leading principle?. If such a principle exist, the facts, as its consequences, must sustain an inner relation to each other. According to Hegel, such a principle does exist. He defines universal history as the progress of mankind in the consciousness of freedom. This is no less grandly and truly thought than it is simply and strikingly uttered.

That which is truly new in history is the deeper apprehension of the conception of freedom, which permeates and transforms all special elements of life with itself. So far, then, something new *does* occur under the sun. Mind, as phenomenal, is infinitely perfectable. In their material aspect the actions of men remain ever the same, but the consciousness with which they act changes. The more difficult question now

arises for philosophy, Where in the system does history find its place? for art, religion, and science, belong to history. It may unhesitatingly be granted that the philosophy of history should be placed at the close of the system. It would be pedantic to deny this. Since consciousness finds its most precise expression in philosophy, the conception of science might very well be combined with that of history, and be exhibited as its highest result. That Hegel brought his history to a close with the conception of the state, is accounted for by the essence of freedom, which, in the state, acquires indubitable objective existence, and gives distinct consciousness of right and duty to the moral worth of human actions, while in art and religion, phantasy and in science, doubt and error have large scope. The law-books of nations are the concrete criterion according to which this consciousness of freedom may be measured. The state embraces the totality of all relations which refer to the idea of good. Here, as in so many other passages, Hegel resembles Kant, who would likewise see the conception of the state made to preside over the development of history. In the introduction Hegel entered into an exhaustive justification of his thoughts, in which he essentially explained and completed that conception of the state which he had proposed in the Philosophy of Right. If any one still has scruples as to whether Hegel meant well for freedom, or how he understands the conception of ethics, he is referred to this derivation of the conception of universal history from the conception of the state. It is also an example how, with the purest German idioms, a profound thought may be presented with perfect clearness and intelligibility. The way in which he describes ethics, both here and in the Philosophy of Right, can be compared only with the inimitable art with which Jacob Grimm treated similar objects. The purest fountains of German words sprung spontaneously for both. A poetic ether hangs over the creative constructions of this great teacher even when they descend to the plane of the readiest intelligibility.

The constant elements of history he had already investigated in the Phenomenology as the science of the experience of consciousness. There, as we have already seen, no ethnographic, no chronologic or historic fact was mentioned; no

person in history was named. Now he treated history from the principle of the state. In so doing he followed Kant, who in 1784, in an original treatise, had apprehended the conception of the historical process from this point, because consciousness of freedom attained to objective distinctness in the state. Kant, however, had only made a plan, and had never entered into the details of its execution as Hegel attempted to do.

The geographic element, where we speak of the history of Asia, Africa, Europe and America, does not suffice for history. Nations transcend natural divisions. Geographic distinctness is a very important factor for the historical process, but it is only an external foundation, not a principle. Water, still more than land formation, is adapted to supply a guiding principle, for it mediates the movement of peoples. Kapp, in his philosophy of the knowledge of the Earth (*Erdkunde*), distinguished the oriental, the antique, and the modern world, respectively, as (1) the potamic, (2) the thalassic, (3) the oceanic. Asia produced great states upon the banks of rivers, Europe upon the Mediterranean Sea, and America, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, is essentially oceanic. The next higher element is the anthropological one of racial differences, so far as the black, yellow, and white race exhibit not only a different outer type, but different psychical endowment. But races mix, so that there exists, however much Herr von Gobineau may sigh about it, less pure blood with every advancing generation. In America already all races mingle.

- (1) The Ethiopian is for itself unhistorical;
- (2) The Mongolian is historically at a stand-still;
- (3) The Caucasian is historically progressive.

An anthropological analogy is connected with the ethnographic element, which is derived from the ages of human life, and which is very often repeated. Herder brought it into acceptance and Hegel adopted it.

- (1) The Orientals represent the stage of childhood;
- (2) The Greeks that of youth;
- (3) The Romans that of manhood;
- (4) The Germans that of old age.

History cannot be comprehended under such an analogy, and

therefore the abstract conception of time has been adduced, and history has been divided into (1) Ancient, (2) Middle, and (3) Modern, or simply into Ancient and Modern. Ancient and modern is, however, a purely relative conception ; no principle is expressed thereby. If this is to be done, recourse is had to the break which Christianity made in the world. Thus we come to religion, and it becomes manifest that it cannot be excluded from the development of the state. We speak, therefore, of Heathen, Mohammedan, and Christian States. (1) Paganism—Polytheism—(2) Monotheism, (3) the Christian belief in the Trinity, are qualitative differences in the field of religion. A fantastic element, however, lies in religion which transcends objective reality, while the sphere of the state lies in the indubitable relations of the self-conscious will. So long as these relations are at the same time regarded as religious, or so long as they receive from religion absolute justification in an external manner, the state is not yet perfectly free and sovereign. Hegel demands, therefore, for the perfection of the state "good-will and consent." He will acknowledge right apart from morality. Right should not be an internally foreign, casual determination of man, but he should know himself therein according to his essence. He should regard the state not merely as an institution for the security of his person and possessions, for the advancement of his peculiar interests, but it should be sacred to him as the concrete realization of the idea of good. Hegel, as well as Fichte, Schleiermacher and Steffens, regarded the police state and the industrial state as mere caricatures of the true state. This was not a blasphemous deification of the state, as is so often said ; for he recognized the spheres of religion as transcending those of the state. In his outlines of a new constitution for Germany, he said that the state could admit different confessions, and even that by so doing it would be more free. In his Berlin period he was inclined to regard Protestantism as that confession which alone makes the true ethical state possible. But it appears that the state, as such, has to concern itself merely with the reason of its laws and institutions, without reflecting thereby upon any creed. The modern state, as such, has no religion. This he leaves free to dispose of itself. He concedes to every citizen the right to relate himself to God

according to his own peculiar conviction. The state must do all with the reason of human freedom, and nothing with eternal happiness. This he leaves to the belief of the individual. It is the highest right of man to be free in this from every outer constraint, for here he stands in the deepest mystery. If it be said that the state, to correspond to its true conception, must be Protestant, then the question immediately arises whether Lutheran, or Calvanistic, or Anglican, &c. Thus the presumption that a state ought to have a confession is refuted as factious.

Hegel therefore, for the division of universal history, has ignored religion. He distinguished four ages of the world: (1) the Oriental, (2) the Grecian, (3) the Roman, and (4) the German. Of these four, the two middle periods, in antithesis to the Orient, are fundamentally only one, which we usually call the ancient world. A clear idea is not expressed by this designation. Hegel gives this, therefore, in the form of the qualitative judgment, that in the Orient one is free; in the antique world, several; and in the modern world, all: or, in another form,

- (1) Despotism—Orient;
- (2) Republic—Greece and Rome;
- (3) Constitutional monarchy—the German State.

For Hegel, history furnishes the empirical proof of the necessity of the latter form. He admits at the close of his observations that the main difficulty lies in realizing the justification and defence of all, in legislation. He was an opponent of Rousseau. He desired a representation of the people according to rank. How astonished he would be that, within scarcely twenty years after his death, Europe became politically reconstructed, and that every independent man of legal majority and of unblemished reputation, without distinction of station, race, culture, or fortune, was endowed with full active and passive right of franchise. He would have been shocked to behold in porters, watchmen, coachmen, &c., political persons who had an equal voice with merchants, professors, judges, and counsellors of state. With proper reflection, however, he would have been obliged to recognize in free suffrage the legitimate consequence of the constitutional principle. The idea of the state must pervade and civilize every peas-

ant. It endures no longer plebeian masses (Pöbel). The elective franchise of voters reconciles the sovereignty of the people with the royal sovereignty, in which the former individualizes itself as concrete personality. Since Herder we have had a great multitude of books which have proposed as their end the philosophic consideration of universal-history. They have been for the most part forgotten, because their authors either could not master the empirical material and reduce it to an abstract formulization, or because, like Krause, they proceeded from abstract principles and neglected the empirical process. Talented historians like J. V. Müller, in his 24 volumes of the Universal History of Mankind, or Dippold in his Sketches of History, approached much nearer the true idea of history than the so-called *a priori* constructions. Hegel's work is the only one of these attempts which has proved enduring, because it presents an adjustment of these extremes which is deserving especial admiration. It will evince itself also as classical for the future, because in the form of simple narration it brings out the significance of the idea as the inner soul of facts; and conversely, because, by the very plain and unavoidable evolution of the idea, it recalls to mind the lucidity of historical phenomena, and especially serves, like an enchanting picture, to bring into the present great individuals like Alexander, Cæsar, and Luther. The great fact however remains, that he rightly apprehended the principle of universal history and the conception of freedom. The individual must not be blamed if he helps himself as well as he can, through the life of vicissitude, with hypotheses. One appeals to fate, another to providence; but the necessity of freedom is the absolute might of events. The end of history is not the eudæmonism of sensuousness equipped with every comfort, but freedom, which is fore-knowing in the consciousness of its conformity to law, and by its providence shapes its destiny now tragically, now comically.

Of course, a much stricter carrying out of philosophical history may be conceived than Hegel accomplished, by which the question of the position of the Jews must especially be brought into closer consideration. Hegel ascribed to them different relationships in different fields. In the Philosophy of History he mentioned them only as a moment of the Per-

sian kingdom; in the Philosophy of Religion he placed them immediately before the Greeks. The Jews, however, who constitute the middle term between the national states of the Orient and of classical antiquity, and the humanity-state of the Germano-christian world, belong to universal history. In political culture, in æsthetic refinement, in scientific insight, they are behind many other nations; but in religious inspiration they surpass all others. The universal criterion for the historical significance of nations can lie only in the degree which the conception of manhood has attained reality. From this stand-point the Jews are not only higher than all the nations of the Orient, but higher than Greeks, Romans, or Germans. As the absolute middle term of history they are a contradiction, and maintain still with their nationality a negative relation to the idea of mankind. They make the postulate of a general Theocracy, to which all nations, by their mediation, shall be subjected; but they condemn and kill those Jews who express the consciousness that the true God cannot be merely a national God, but must be the God of all men, from whatever national stock they spring. The nations of the old world fell into three great groups, each of which came to an end with the indifferentiation of its nationality.

I. The Eastern Asiatic group embraces the passive nations which, in contrast to the rough eudæmonism of those historical nations who lived in a state of nature, as the first nations of culture, brought forth at first only a negative ascetic ideal. Such are (1) the Chinese, (2) the East Indians, (3) the Buddhistic or Indo-Chinese nations. The Chinese are contrasted with Indians. The State-principle of the first is the natural ethics of family piety, which passes into moral discipline. The principle of India is the dignity of caste, which leads to a formal Legal state, which stamps the most striking inhumanity as a positive right, because caste and family are united, and the lower caste has no right which the higher must respect. Buddhism seeks emancipation from the inhumanity of a state resting upon caste, by mendicancy, which it exalts to a religion, and affirms the equality of all men in the sufferings of sickness, of age, and of death, as a principle of abstract brotherhood.

II. The Western Asiatic group embraces the active nations which pursue a heroic ideal, and make the enjoyment of the goods of this world the reward of conflict. These are (1) the Persians, (2) the Egyptians, (3) the Semites. The Persians wage war for conquest and dominion; the Egyptians, to defend their states, canals, palaces, temples, and tombs; the Arabian Semites, for the sake of carnage and plunder; the Chaldean Semites, for the defence of their culture and riches; the Phœnician Semites, for the enlargement and defence of trade. Babylon became the seat of continental trade. Tyre and Sidon advanced from land to the sea, and this perfected the cosmopolitan character of trade. The secular disposition of the Semites is the affirmative counterpart of the monastic renunciation of Buddhistic mendicancy. Egypt's attitude of uniformity contrasts strongly with the fantastic excesses and monstrosities of India—the belligerent pathos of the Persians with the peacefulness of the much-eating and much-writing Chinese.

III. The European group embraces (1) the Grecians, (2) the Romans, (3) the Germans (before their conversion to Christianity). These are the nations of political individuality. Interest in the development of the constitution of the state becomes the life problem of the free man. Among the Greeks, the democracy of the community; among the Romans, the aristocracy of the patricians; among the Germans, the monarchy of the elective army-king, became the foundation of their development. The Germans, in their migrations and wars, effected the dissolution of the nations subjugated by the Romans, but freshened them with their own blood. They made themselves the greatest and most powerful people which thenceforth no other was able to withstand. This universal dominion became possible only by the acceptance of Christianity, because this consecrated their extraordinary and naturally developed power as the organ of the idea of manhood. The Jews are contrasted with all these nations chiefly as theocratic: they integrate all special elements by which the former nations made epochs in history, but give them a peculiar concatenation which cancels the consequences of their one-sided exclusiveness.

Nationality has for the Jew, not *as* but *through* the merely

natural bond of unity, an infinite significance, viz. that the descendant of Abraham had the good fortune to come into immediate relation to the true God, and to His will as revealed in the law. The Gentile, by recognition of the law and by circumcision, can become a member of the theocracy, just as, conversely, the defection of the individual estranges him from his people. In other words, the Jewish nationality does not rest upon physical but upon spiritual grounds, and is therefore stronger than mere nationality. Faith in the God of Abraham, and not parentage, which is only of secondary importance, makes the Jew a Jew. Moses, when very old, did not hesitate to espouse a negress. His brothers and sisters disapproved, but Jehovah punished them. Jesus expressed the freedom of faith from external hereditary descent, by asking the Pharisees, who were proud of their genealogy, if they did not believe God could raise up seed to Abraham from every stone. As Semites, the Jews did not deny a realistic sense for the goods of this world: they conquered Canaan, a land flowing with milk and honey; but the idea which inspired them, and pervaded their entire life, was that of holiness. A closer analysis of their ethical organization shows that in real humanity they stood higher, before Christianity, than all other nations, although the history of the Jews is crowded with traces of the most depraved and abominable transgression, because in no people has the might of passion been shown in greater intensity against the law of God.

By their faith they were free from the demoniac might of Nature which represses all other nations. This point alone makes it impossible to coördinate them with the other nations of antiquity. They were free from the pressure of history when its weight threatened to crush them, by the belief that their God still held out universal dominion to them. This faith consoles them to the present day, and causes them to regard Christianity as an episode in their history. The Jews, like the Chinese, honor family piety, but they do not make it an exclusive principle. Like the East Indians they divided into tribes, but have not petrified in castes; and the tribe of Levi, to which the discharge of priestly functions is committed, does not therefore enjoy the precedence of a holier or more divine tribe, for all are a priestly nation.

Holiness is the injunction upon every Jew, but he need not like the Buddhist become a monk and a beggar. The Jews are soldiers, and, up to the revolt of Bar-Chochba under Hadrian, have shown an incomparable bravery which was adequate to contend with the most powerful nations. They did not set out, like the Persians, upon a career of conquests, but were content with that of Canaan as the ancient settlement of the descendants of Abraham. The Jew pursues agriculture and pasturage like the Egyptians, and trade like the Babylonians and Phœnicians, without carrying this activity to a ruinous extent. In the constitution, he proceeds, like the Greek, from the conception of the community. The seventy elders constitute a senate — the aristocratic Roman element; the monarchical element can consequently reside only in God, who reveals His will to the people through the prophets. The kingdom was an inconsequence for the Jews, and the prophet Samuel expressly dissuaded them from it. After a short period of prosperity their state was brought to desolation through this very cause. After their return from exile, the centre of their entire organization fell more exclusively to the high-priests. The prophets, as the free representatives of the entire people, exercised the same function which we now call freedom of the press. The chief moment of the original German state, feudalism, was not wanting among the Jews, inasmuch as they held all Canaan as a fief of Jehovah, which every fifty years should be returned to Him. I believe, therefore, that the position of the Jews in universal history is found by contrasting them, as the only true Theocrats, with the nations of antiquity, but at the same time, in this antithesis, to place them higher than they. The Jews, like the Germans, are an absolute migratory people, which persists through all other peoples. The Germans generally lose their nationality among other nations and fuse with them, while the Jews know how to maintain theirs in every act of life. In the sketch which Hegel has given at the conclusion of his *Philosophy of Right*, he mentions the Israelitic people, on their entrance into the Germanic world, as that people among whom the ceaseless pain of the absolute separation of man from God made the transition to absolute atonement of God with men. This I believe to be the correct position of

the Jews. The following division of universal history results : (1) the National state, (2) the Theocratic state, (3) the state of Humanity. He concludes with the Germans because, within the Caucasian race, they are in fact that race to which the initiative of all further movement in universal history falls. From Europe they have spread themselves by navigation into every quarter of the world. They compel innumerable peoples in a state of nature, who have previously stood outside the process of universal history, either to enter into it or to vanish. They compel, also, the old historical nations of the Orient to remove their rigid exclusiveness, and to attempt self-regeneration by a higher principle.

THE LOGICAL QUESTION IN HEGEL'S SYSTEM.

Translated from the German of TRENDLENBURG by THOS. DAVIDSON.

(Continued.)

It has been often enough repeated, and Germany knows the formula by heart, that Hegel's great merit is that he defines God as a subject, in contradistinction to Spinozism which defines Him as substance. In the reply this is likewise enlarged upon (p. 116 *et alibi*). It may, perhaps, have been necessary to call attention on every possible occasion to this, inasmuch as a modern Spinozism has developed itself out of Hegel. An appeal is made to the consciences of those opponents who "assault Hegel with murderous intent, and mercilessly mangle him," not to condemn a philosophy in which God is assumed to be *spirit* (p. 131). Hegel's highest absolute principle is made to depend upon the significance of *subject* (p. 116), and the *Logical Investigations* are treated cavalierly because they do not touch this point—this solution, given by Hegel—of the fundamental question of all philosophy. Is this last true? In a philosophy of cognition the mere dogma counts for nothing, while the process by which it is reached and proved counts for everything. The question therefore is, how this applies to Hegel. In him, the said process is based on the important and difficult part of the *Logic* (*Encyclopædia*, § 150 sqq.), in which it is supposed

to be shown how, according to dialectic reason, the necessity which is the attribute of substance passes over into the freedom of the idea. There and nowhere else in Hegel is the *primum movens* which draws the thinking on from substance to subject. In the *Logical Investigations*, therefore (I., p. 50 sqq.*), this most important of all dialectic transitions, upon which the weight of the whole system rests, was carefully considered, and shown to be without any support, and to give way and vanish as soon as it is touched. While substance may get outside of itself, subject, we are told, is with itself (*apud se*). But it was shown that this being-with-itself of Hegel's rests merely upon a vague, feeble comparison—a play of similar expressions. It was demonstrated that the process by which it was reached would apply as well to blind emanation as to free creation from the idea of purpose, and that, hence, it contains no progress from the doctrine of substance to subject. The logical difficulty was at the same time made apparent; for it was the logical question that was under discussion. How does the reply venture to speak as if no notice had been taken of this determination, which is supposed to condition all the rest? Does it go even so far, seeing that it appeals so often to the elevation of substance to subject, as to remove those inherent obstacles which were shown to exist? It was easier to pass over the objections raised without *one word* of comment. If, however, it is true that, in Hegel, the doctrine which is so warmly recommended in the reply rests, in its deepest metaphysical basis, on this sole point of the *Logic*, then that doctrine must stand or fall with it.

That, in its new shape, it seeks for a new support, is of no consequence; if it is to continue true to Hegel, it cannot get round this original ground; while, if it does not continue true to Hegel, it no longer comes within the limits of our discussion.

In Hegel's *Logic*, the point in question is one of the boldest turns taken by the negativity. If, as is the case, the reply accuses us of not having considered closely enough this fundamental law of all thinking, which is likewise a fundamental law of all being, what we have said above is a sufficient

* Third edition, p. 51 sqq.—Tr.

refutation of the charge. Why should the reply at all insist upon investigations, seeing that itself does not condescend to any of those proposed to it? It is, however, the opposite of correct to assert that the Negativity has not been investigated. The Negativity, the perpetual spur of the dialectic movement of thought, so highly extolled again in the reply, rests, in Hegel's view, on negation and identity; and indeed on the latter, inasmuch as it is the negation of negation. Both these logical appliances were fully and fairly put to the test, both in their principle and in their different applications, and rejected as ambiguous and untenable (*Log. Inv.* I., pp. 30–56). Sometimes, in Hegel, the Negativity shoots off on the leaping-pole of the *progressus in infinitum*; but it also broke down under the hands of criticism (*Log. Inv.* I., pp. 55 sq.) Before Gabler asserted that the author of the *Logical Investigations*, having no knowledge of the fact that the negativity was the soul in the forms of dialectic development, or of the manner of its operation, had not specially made it a subject of criticism, he might have read those passages, or else he might have shown what *logical element*, besides those discussed, was contained in the negativity. It was incumbent upon him, not to repeat in vague terms a eulogy on negativity, but simply, in accordance with this fundamental law, to employ the energetic negation of negation on the negation of our criticism, so as not to allow the negativity to stick fast in the negation, but to bring it out in the positivity claimed for it. But there was not even an attempt made in this direction.

“Negativity” is an imposing word; as an abstraction, it keeps the intuition suspended and the mind in wonderment. As Plato in the *Philebus* tells us that the youth triumphed as if they had found a treasure of wisdom, when they made their first acquaintance with the One and the Many, and, in their enthusiasm, applied it to every concept, so precisely it is with the cognate fundamental law of negativity: for, of course, everything is intrinsically negative, in everything there is flux, in everything there is distinction; and what is easier than to place the aim “which repels itself from itself” under negativity? But the result is much less considerable in the case of the negativity than in that of the great treasure-house of “The One and the Many”; for it is such an abstrac-

tion as no longer represents an original and productive Universal, but has upset itself and thus lost all tangibility. If we are honored with some sprinklings of praise, because the principle of motion brought forward in the *Logical Investigations* is similar to negativity, we object to any such kinship. Negativity is like a large mantle, of which many folds can be made, to stow away the most various things. It is, as our investigation has shown, entirely indefinite and ambiguous. Against it the *Logical Investigations* rebelled, and endeavored to free the conceptional faculty from the spell with which this and similar words had bound it. They restored to intuition its freedom, and thereby to thought its definiteness, by proving that movement, which outlines and produces a picture, was the intellectual principle of intuition and *form*. The Proteus of negativity would do well to keep at a respectful distance from it; he would meet his death in it.

In the *Logical Investigations*, and in the brief statement afterwards published, the result of the inquiry into the dialectic method went to show that it was *per se* impossible. Our author feels, in spite of his attempt to make the position of the dialectic method less fatal, that still Hegel's philosophy becomes an impossible system, and therefore enters the strongest protests against this ruling. Is the existence of the case a proof of its intrinsic possibility? That will not pass muster; for, as the reply itself says, the very questions at issue are those of existence and recognition. Or, was the judgment in the *Logical Investigations* merely a feint announced with a flourish of trumpets? Neither can that be asserted. For the judgment was well supported by the proofs brought forward in the course of a long investigation. It was proved, and in the statement of the position of the question again asserted, that all the logical means used by the dialectic method fell to pieces, and, measured by the standard of their own purpose, were sadly insufficient and even impossible. The simple conclusion was, that the dialectic method was intrinsically impossible, because its means were so. From this demonstration, apart from good assurances, which are not spared, but which avail nothing, there is but one means of escape. It would have to be shown that those logi-

cal means (negation, identity, progress *in infinitum*) really perform what they promise, and, just because they perform it, have an energetic actuality over and above their intrinsic possibility. Has this been done? The reply takes the shorter way of preferring not to touch the point at all (p. 204). We are perfectly satisfied with this, since, supported by the old grounds, we may again pronounce the judgment that the dialectic method of pure thought is in itself impossible, and add that it has not been rendered a whit more possible by the reply in question.

Hegel's *Logic* asserted that, as opposed to all intuition, even to the geometric figure, it moved in the element of pure thought, and, without any presupposition, developed from this alone an uninterrupted "immanent" series of metaphysical concepts. We, on the other hand, showed, both in general and in particular, that the presuppositionless logic everywhere presupposes the principle and the general activity of intuition, and thus in secret possesses a picture which in public it contemns; we showed that, instead of developing from itself a closely-knit series, it smuggled in the despised intuitions of experience, diluted and weakened, and gave them out as products of its own soil. What has the reply to say to this thorough-going proof? "The manifest discovery," it says, (p. 193 sqq.) "does not touch the thing itself—the pure concepts—in their distinct form, but merely their origin—the source from which they come into thought"; it does not touch the *what* of the pure immaterial concepts and determinations of thought, but rather *their origin in thought*. In the first instance, this is certainly the whole question. Did the assertion of presuppositionless thinking, and of immanent interconnection, mean anything else than that the concepts did not flow from a foreign source, e.g. from intuition, but from the native one of pure thought? Only the delusiveness of this magnificent promise was to be shown. The reply, if we understand it correctly, admits this proof—and how much is thereby admitted!—but it consoles itself with the distinction that the question of the *whence* does not touch the *what*. Is this possible in the present instance? Hitherto, for example, it was asserted in Hegel's *Logic*, that continuous and discrete, extensive and intensive magnitude, attraction and

repulsion, all occurring in the first part of the *Logic*, not as concrete examples and applications, but as the purest determinations, were to be seized as concepts of the pure thinking without intuition, and therefore without that movement which produces the geometrical figure. If the opposite of this it has been proved, it touches the *what* of the pure concepts so far, that there are no such "pure concepts" in disjunct form. The author of the reply is perhaps aware of this; for he glides rapidly over the dangerous point, and vents his spleen in heavy charges of empiricism and materialism, with which he loads the *Logical Investigations*.

We shall not waste a word on these charges, since the person who can believe that such accusations will cling to the work, cannot have read it, or must have read it merely with the eyes on his face. It is true that it does not deal with any sort of dialectic idealism, which, unconcerned about any connection with the other sciences, and despising any contradiction which the latter, with the support of facts, might raise against Philosophy, dwells on the royal heights of the pure idea, with an empire all to itself, perfectly secure against being confounded with empiricism. If, however, Philosophy is, as Schleiermacher somewhere calls it, the central science, and there is no centre except with reference to the circumference, just as there is no circumference save with reference to the centre, then surely the time has come at last to strive for further progress, and to bring about a living connection between the central and the peripheral sciences. Logic must become a metaphysic of the actual sciences, in the sense that it must comprehend their real principles in order to comprehend the act of thinking within its sphere, and thus to become a true logic. Are we to be accused of empiricism because we deal with experience in this sense? The fact that we are so accused is indeed perfectly intelligible from the stand-point of dialectic idealism, but not from that of impartial criticism, which would have justice enough to remark and to recognize, that we on all occasions and even in the very midst of experience look only for its spiritual origin, i.e. the very thing which has not experience in it.

It was our wish, in writing the previous article, to treat the logical question in Hegel's system by itself, and to keep

apart, as something altogether foreign, our own logical investigations in so far as they investigate positively the essence of cognition. In the reply, the two are commingled, and defence, as is perfectly fair, is supplemented by attack. We must therefore add a few words in regard to the method of criticism, in order to remove from the question at issue the false lights and shadows that are thrown upon it from this quarter.

Firstly, there is one thing characteristic. In a long book written to criticise another, the reader looks in vain for the real content of the latter, as forming the basis of the criticism. He looks in vain for an outline of the *Investigations*, for a sketch of their method, for the sum of their results, for a presentation of the fundamental thought. Only from such a survey could he derive a notion of what the *Logical Investigations* specially attempt, and whether they unite to form a spiritual whole. A person who knows a system only by the headings of the paragraphs, is not likely to find it in them; whereas the person who is able to follow it through the windings of the investigations and to restate it in his own words, will not miss it. When the reader of the reply puts it down, he is as wise respecting the purpose and essence of the *Logical Investigations* as he was before he took them up; or, what is perhaps worse, his head is filled with the most contradictory judgments, since the reply is a perfect conglomerate of appreciation and depreciation, respect and disrespect. At one time, the author of the *Logical Investigations* is a disciple of Aristotle, who, be it remembered, is counted by Hegel among the speculative philosophers; at another time, he is an empiricist and a materialist, utterly destitute of anything speculative: according to one passage, he fights with Hegel for the present world-consciousness; at another, he is related only to Bacon and Locke, although these are long ago buried for German science;—at one time, his philosophy is valuable as a propædeutic which might pass for Hegelian; at another, he has written only for “business men” (p. 177);—at one time, the *Logical Investigations* appear to merit a place among literary productions; at another, they are described as a mere rude compilation, without plan or principle (pp. 178 sqq.), so that the reader cannot help won-

dering why, for the sake of such a book, our author undertook to write another book, and why he found himself compelled by it to put his old system into a new shape;—at one time, the reply attributes to the development of the categories and principles (*principia*) a value which it afterwards lowers by the additional assertion that Hegel *also* has them, only in a somewhat different shape (?!);—at one time, he denies to the enumeration (which, a moment before, he called development) every claim to system;—in another place, it honors the organic world-view with which the *Logical Investigations* close with a certain amount of applause; at another, it hints that this world-view is such as might be suitable for children, although, of course, it would be of no use to them, as they do not philosophize (p. 188).

But has Gabler quite perused, or quite overlooked, the *Logical Investigations*, about which he has written a book? We must be allowed to express our doubts. He would hardly, for example, have ventured (pp. 184 sq.), in plain terms, to refer the author of the *Logical Investigations* to Hegel's treatment and derivation of the categories, if he had remembered that the same had been subjected to a careful examination (*Log. Inv.* II., pp. 62 sqq.), in which they were shown to be entirely unequal to developing the possibility of this concept, and proving the necessity of its dominance. He would hardly, had he known the whole, have given all kinds of good counsels, which the *Logical Investigations* had long ago followed of their own accord (e.g. cf. p. 184 *ad fin.*, with *Log. Invest.* II., pp. 62 sqq.) He would hardly have hinted—we cannot understand the passage otherwise (p. 187)—that the *Logical Investigations*, pregnant with materialism, “looked upon thought as a mere accessory, or something merely secondary and superinduced,” if he had considered, what is pointedly shown (II., pp. 62 sqq.), that the world, penetrated as it is with purpose, can be understood only by admitting the priority of thought. He would hardly have charged the *Logical Investigations* with a blind reverence for nature (e.g. p. 179), if he had only remarked their general tendency, which is to prove that the comprehension of nature, in movement and in purpose, is derived entirely from the original Spiritual in nature. He would hardly have ventured to tax

the whole view with vulgar empiricism (pp. 193, 197, &c.), if he had considered that same general tendency, and if he had been aware of the war which the *Logical Investigations* wage with empiricism, and that too in the very midst of the facts, for the sake of this tendency (e.g. I., pp. 206 sqq., 274, sqq., &c.) He would scarcely have had the hardihood to assert (p. 200) that the *Logical Investigations* abandon the à-priority of time and space, while, on the contrary, they everywhere strive to prove that the spiritual à-priority of movement with its products, time and space, alone affords a key to the great scientific, *a priori* fact of pure mathematics, and use every effort to show that the objectivity of these categories is not thereby excluded, and that the same à-priority is the basis of all empiricism (cf. the whole of Investigations 5 and 6, pp. 124-277). He would hardly have ventured to squeeze a single expression respecting the idea, till he brought out of it the result, that, according to the *Logical Investigations*, it is only as substance (Spinozan ?!) that God lies at the basis of the world (p. 189), if he had remembered that the idea is idea only through the creative thought of aim (*Zweck*) (II., pp. 359 sqq.) He would hardly have ventured to counsel the *Logical Investigations* to follow the fundamental principle of the Hegelian system, which is, at the same time, the logical principle of form, through the sphere of philosophy, and prove it insufficient and incapable of explaining anything, if he had reflected that the section on the dialectic method and the criticism of the Hegelian notion of aim have performed said task, and that it is precisely Hegel's logical principle of form that so completely breaks down in the detailed examination of his development of the judgment (II., pp. 190 sqq., and the syllogism (II., pp. 251 sqq.) He would scarcely have said that the *Logical Investigations* were unacquainted with the Hegelian syllogism, and acted as if they had confounded it with the scholastic syllogism, if he had remembered how (II., pp. 251-279) they first turn it round and consider it from all sides, before they declare that Hegel's twisted theory of three times three syllogisms, which are supposed to produce and classify the system of things in their reality, was manufactured and untrue. These facts are incredible, but they are facts. If our author could overlook all these and many other things, where,

with such defects of knowledge and misconceptions in regard to matters of fact, remains the right to criticize?

The author of the reply cannot get rid of himself. For what is peculiar in the writings of others, for the specific in the *tout ensemble* of the doctrine of his opponents, he has no eye, and, therefore, no expression. He evidently feels hostile to an investigation which pursues a path different from his, and which takes pains, in dealing with the elements of thought, till, after quiet progress, it comes at last to a point at which the elements necessarily coalesce in the fact of a whole. Ever and everywhere the absolute comes up in his writing, as if it were the only question, and as if human thinking, which, after all, in the broad sphere of the sciences, thinks the finite in the first instance, did not move at all in the finite. It shows itself likewise in the outward form, so that he never succeeds in bridling and controlling the association of his own ideas long enough to make those of other people his own. For while, as a general rule, people are not given to interrupting each other, he everywhere interlards other people's statements with interjections and remarks of his own. When these parentheses and interjections are taken away, there remains very little counter-argument. But parentheses will hardly pass for discussions, or interjections for solid judgments. After all, there is a great difference between real and manufactured consequences. Real ones lie in that which is based upon a principle, and such of those scientific consequences as do not appear in the *Logical Investigations* will be shown hereafter in the further carrying out of the thought. Manufactured consequences, on the other hand, lie in one-sided half-truths picked up at random, and in words caught and pressed into service (p. 189). We decline to accept any ransom for the captives taken in our work; they will get freed without our help, in the mind of the intelligent reader. The objections raised in the reply are altogether not of a kind to prevent us in any way from continuing our superstructure on the basis of the *Logical Investigations*. At the same time, it is quite natural that our opponents should try to make us occupy an "obsolete stand-point" (*überwunderer Standpunkt*), one assigning us to empiricism, a second to Aristotle, a third to Kant, a fourth to Herakleitos. Let us, think they, dress

him up in some old worn-out dress of the world-spirit; and the present, which wants fashion, will not look at him. There is, perhaps, reason in that. How many stand-points, however, Hegel has made obsolete, is shown by the present rebellion of all.

It is the aim of the reply to force the examination of human thought ever toward the Absolute, and to maintain Hegel's Absolute,—although in a new shape, which will perhaps be as little recognized by foes or friends as Gabler is inclined to recognize the dressing up of Hegel's in the gold frame of fancy and the trappings of poetry (p. IV.) But as this new shape, like every other shape which calls itself an emanation from Hegel, rests on the dialectic method, everything, as was shown in the previous article, reduces itself to the question whether the dialectic method of pure thinking is correct. If it is false, there arises from it no knowledge, and no new mode of seizing the Absolute. It is therefore of no use to swing round in one's own circle; the question always comes up again: What has been done to redeem the dialectic method? for it is the basis of the whole.

In the previous article, the main points at issue were clearly set forth; they were,

- 1°. The suppositionless beginning;
- 2°. The immanent interconnection;
- 3°. The significance of the negation;
- 4°. The power of identity;
- 5°. The application of the *progressus in infinitum*;
- 6°. The methodical *hysteron-proteron* of the dialectic development;
- 7°. The delusiveness of the Hegelian syllogism.

Among these, again, the assertion of the absence of presupposition, the negation, and the identity, stand prominent as the real pillars of the whole edifice. In the reply, there is as good as nothing on all these points—at least, there is scarcely one word looking at all like a refutation, or really bringing home a misapprehension. It brings no danger except to the cause which the reply defends, when it refuses to occupy itself with all these things, or, as we say, does not stand up and hold its own. Thus, then, the *Logical Question in Hegel's System* stands at precisely the same point where it stood at

the close of the previous essay; there is not a single iota cleared up. At best, we have been shown, by one example, how it can *not* be cleared up.

We are told in the *Theaitetos* of Plato, in connection with that movement, to which Hegel compared the negativity, concerning the disciples of the profound Herakleitos:—"About these speculations of Herakleitos which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot talk with them about them. For, in accordance with their text-books, they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of doing this; or, rather, they have no particle of rest in them, and they are in a state of negation of rest which no words can express. If you ask any one of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you inquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and *will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another.*"

THE MERCHANT OF VENICE.

By D. J. SNIDER.

[Conclusion of the Article in the April number.]

In a late number of the Journal there was a partial analysis of Shakespeare's "Merchant of Venice." We now propose to complete that criticism by extending it to other parts of the same drama. But first it will be well to recapitulate the results arrived at in the former essay. Only the leading collision of the play was there developed, that between Shylock and Antonio. The first characteristic to be observed in respect to these two characters is that the one was a Jew and the other a Christian; hence the historical collision involved in the drama was between the Hebrew and the modern world. But, in the second place, this collision was elevated from a merely natural to a spiritual basis by the ends which these two men proposed; that of Shylock being the acquisition of

gain, in general Thrift; while that of Antonio, though he was a merchant, subordinated money to higher purposes. In the third place, Shylock's end—Property—is absolutely confirmed and protected by Law, which possesses objective validity, and cannot be assailed with impunity. With this mighty principle Antonio falls into conflict by his bond, for bonds and all contracts must be held sacred if property be protected. Hence Law enforces Shylock's end and seizes upon Antonio. But Formal Law manifests its limitation through its own self-contradiction and thus annuls itself,—this is the point made by Portia in her celebrated defence whereby Antonio is saved. But this result cannot be final, for it is purely negative and terminates in the annulment of Law; hence we pass to a higher principle which takes up and harmonizes within itself the negation before mentioned, namely, the principle of Mercy, which in its turn saves the Jew. When Law becomes self-contradictory, annihilates its own end, destroys that which it was made to protect, there must be some way of abating its action, and this is accomplished by a system of mercy. But let it not be forgotten that within its own sphere Law is paramount, and cannot be interfered with from any quarter. The reason why the Jew does not perish, though he has willed and tried to commit murder, is that he was the real object of mercy, since he was arraigned for subjective intention which lay outside of his consciousness. Hence he was in truth not responsible. Nor could the court and Portia reasonably condemn the Jew after they had maintained the cause of mercy with such persistency and power. It would be a flagrant inconsistency to demand that for Antonio which they the next moment refuse to Shylock. Hence the piece is not a tragedy. Moreover, it will be seen at the very outset that this play, if it be true to thought and history, cannot have a tragic termination. Christianity has triumphed in the world, and its representative, who is here Antonio, cannot perish in such a conflict. Nor can the Jew suffer death at the hands of Christians, for their doctrine is forgiveness and mercy. Hence the difficulty must be mediated. But who is to perform the act of mediation? This question brings us to the third leading character of the drama—Portia.

But before we go on let us speak of a possible misunderstanding. By the foregoing remarks, or in the previous essay, it is not meant to assert or to be implied that the Jews of the present day are Shylocks. On the contrary, they have risen out of the narrow limits of nationality and religion as completely as any other people. No one can deny them their full share of the culture, liberality and genius of modern times. Nor is the historical position of this nationality to be underestimated. It has certainly contributed the largest ingredient to our modern civilization, and it alone of all world-historical peoples of antiquity is in existence to-day. Shylock, however, represents the ancient Hebrew, with all his peculiarities, cast into the modern world. He is the product of two influences: first, the original Jewish character; secondly, that character in a strange land, persecuted and outlawed by society. Hence the bitterness which overflows his whole existence, and poisons not merely his social relations, but his own domestic hearth. In America these external restraints are removed, there is hardly a prejudice except what is imported, and no one would think of distinguishing in any public relation the Jews from the common body of citizens.

But to resume. Portia is the third great character of the play, and in importance stands quite on a par with Antonio and Shylock. Her function is mediatorial; in fact, she may be called the grand mediatrix of the entire drama. In her we see the instrumentality by which the main results are brought about. Through her courtship with Bassanio, Antonio comes into the power of the Jew by means of the loan. At her house all the personages of the play assemble and the wooing is done. Moreover, she accomplishes the rescue of Antonio, which is the main mediation of the poem. The great principle of which she is the bearer may be termed the Right of Subjectivity. She asserts the validity of the Internal and the Spiritual against the crushing might of externality. But she does not deny the Right of the Objective in its true limitation. Only when this Objective becomes destructive of its end and self-contradictory, as in the case when the Law was about to murder Antonio, does she place a limit to it and invoke a higher principle. Her struggle is with legality and proscription asserting themselves in spheres where they do

not belong. But in relations when this contradiction no longer appears, she is the most ethical of women. In the Family her subordination is complete, almost devout. In fact, we shall see that all her acts have one end and one impelling motive: devotion to her husband, an absolute unity with his feelings and interests; in other words, subordination to the Family. She vindicates the Right of Subjectivity to herself in order that she may obtain the one whom she really loves, without which principle, it need hardly be said, the true existence of the Family is impossible. So peculiar is this character, so difficult is it to ascertain its unity, and so important is its place in the drama, that we shall be justified in looking somewhat minutely at all the circumstances in which it has been placed by the poet.

First comes the long array of suitors, among whom were to be seen the nobility from every part of Europe—nay, even from Africa. The motive for this elaborate display, as we have before intimated, was to show the necessity of Bassanio's borrowing large sums of money to compete with these nobles, and also to exhibit Portia in all her dignity and splendor. But Portia has quite disregarded the outward glitter of wealth and rank, and has seemingly sought out a follower in the retinue of a lord instead of the lord himself—"a Venetian, a scholar, and a soldier, that came hither in the company of the Marquis of Montferrat." So at the outset we see that she cares naught for the External, but lays stress upon the Internal. The poet has thus given us an inkling of her inclination that we may not be in the dark about her choice. Moreover, we already know of the inclination of Bassanio from the very first scene of the play, and he too is aware of Portia's preference for himself. This point, then, let us carefully bear in mind, that the poet has already let us into the secret, unknown to the outside world, that Portia and Bassanio love one another, and that each one knows of the other's love. The two people, therefore, belong together; they alone can form a rational union, since they possess the absolute prerequisite of the Family, namely, reciprocal love.

Under ordinary circumstances nothing would remain but that the happy pair should go to the nearest church, and, in common parlance, have the knot tied. But to this blissful

consummation there is a great obstacle. Portia's father is dead, and has left a will which seems to bind her choice of a husband to a hopeless accident. Three caskets, made of gold, silver, and lead, respectively, are to be set before his daughter's suitors for selection, and that casket which contains her image carries with it her hand in marriage. Hence we find her lamenting in almost her first words that she cannot choose whom she would, nor refuse whom she disliked. But she recognizes the binding validity of the last request of her parent, and thus we have one of Shakespeare's favorite collisions, which may be stated as the Right of Choice against the will of the parent. Both sides have their validity, and it is just this validity of both sides which makes it a genuine collision. None will deny the right of the parent over the child, and this right was less circumscribed in former times than at present. But though the parent may no longer have any legal right, he has still the right of respect, and no child with a truly ethical feeling such as Portia undoubtedly possessed would withhold obedience. Such is the one side. But the other side is what we have termed the Right of Choice, or, in general terms, the Right of Subjectivity. This demands that the daughter should have absolutely the right of selecting her partner for life. She has to bear the responsibility of her choice, for she must live with him. The husband and wife constitute that unity called the Family: it is a unity of emotion; each party finds true life in the other. This emotion, by which both are melted together into one common existence, is called love. So if we have a true unity, or a true Family, there is the indispensable condition of love. Now it is just this important element that the will of Portia's father flings to the winds by exposing the choice of her to mere accident. It does not demand reciprocal love, which is the only basis of rational marriage. Such is the problem which Portia has to solve, and such is the mental conflict which we find her undergoing. Let us, then, carefully observe how she manages the matter.

All the suitors have taken their departure except two (not including Bassanio), who are more determined or less punctilious than the rest. The causes of this withdrawal are not given, but may be easily imagined; we may suppose they

were men of honor, and would refuse to acquire a wife by lot, to take the hand without the heart. Portia, too, may have shown in an unmistakable manner her dislikes, or, finally, they may have found the last condition too hard, viz. that they must swear never to woo another woman. Whatever the reason may have been, they all vanish after they had served the poet's purpose. But those who remain demand to have the caskets placed before them. The first one who goes through with the process of selection is the Prince of Morocco, who chooses by the outside appearance, and seems to rest his claim upon physical courage. He takes the golden casket, whose glitter typifies the brilliant exterior. Of course, such a choice is directly antagonistic to the character of Portia, and it is logically impossible that he can become her husband. The second one, the Prince of Arragon, chooses only to a certain extent by the outside, since he takes the silver casket, and he rests his claims upon merit. Now merit is a most excellent thing, but we all know that it can never supply the place of love. It is no uncommon occurrence that the more deserving are passed by and the less worthy are chosen, and who will say that it is not justifiable? Both Princes fail. Why? Because they lack the subjective element—love; at least, the love of Portia. For, as before stated, in order to form a true basis of the family relation, love must be reciprocal—each one must feel and find his or her own harmonious existence in the other. Rank, wealth, courage and merit are much in their places, but they can never be substituted for affection. Thus we see that the rejection of these suitors was not a mere fortuitous circumstance, but a logical necessity of the play.

Now comes Bassanio. He has both the requisite elements, loves and is loved; for the poet has carefully told us all this beforehand. We have no doubt of his success from the start. It is curious to trace the ethereal, almost imperceptible influences which the poet brings to bear upon Bassanio to determine his choice. First, his state of mind, all a-glow with affection; no wonder that he disregards the exterior of things, for love is blind. Then Portia in the same condition, and giving expression to it in words; to which we may add, in imagination, her looks. Finally, the music, and the vague

hints of the song, until the feeling of internality is intensified to such a degree as to be irresistible. The very air seems to whisper in the ear of Bassanio, "Take the leaden casket," since it is the negation of all outside show and glitter. In it he finds the picture of Portia, a most fitting symbol of the internal nature of the characters of both Bassanio and Portia, as well as of their relation to one another—the image of the loved one imprinted on the heart. The same principle which causes the rejection of the two Princes must bring about the triumph of Bassanio. The moments of a rational marriage are now complete, Portia and Bassanio have all the elements of a true union. Such is undoubtedly the logic of the play. Thus the choice of caskets, which seemed to represent a horrible Chance about to crush out the rights of human nature, is spiritualized into the highest forms of freedom. Portia wins, and moreover wins through the very instruments which threatened her happiness, converts them to weapons for her own rescue. The choice exhibits the ends and motives of the chooser, and, in so far as these are finite and fall short of the Rational, failure results. In this sphere, namely, the unity which forms the basis of the marriage relation, the Rational is the Right of Subjectivity.

But does Portia really give any hint to Bassanio which of the caskets to choose? It will be recollected that it was forbidden her in her father's will to tell this secret. A suspicious circumstance is the introduction of a song during the choice of Bassanio, which the previous choosers did not have the benefit of. Hence one is inclined to scrutinize closely the meaning of this song. It is somewhat enigmatic, yet its general purport may be stated to be: "Don't choose by the eye, by the glittering outside, for it is the source of all delusion." Hence Portia, after observing with the greatest care all the formalities of her father's will, breaks it just at the point of its conflict with her subjective right. This is done so delicately by her that it is scarcely perceived; still it is none the less real. Thus she stands here as the grand bearer of the Right of Subjectivity in its special form of Love *versus* Obedience to the will of the parent.

We have already several times called attention to the fact that Shakespeare has been very careful to show the mutual

affection of both parties. These were the two that belonged together, and were bound to come together in spite of all obstacles. The two Princes exhibit various phases of conflict with this principle of love, which was finally to triumph. Otherwise the poem would be irrational, which in Art is the Ugly. Here we may note a distinction between Shakespeare and an inferior poet. The latter, instead of hedging Chance on all sides and making it the lowest possible factor, would have given it full scope. For he seeks dramatic effects by surprise. Shakespeare, on the contrary, always prepares, never surprises. He elaborates the motives and ends, and marches to their logical conclusion. We feel that so it is, and cannot be otherwise; the process has all the rigid necessity of Reason. But the novelist or playwright seeks to produce a "sensation" through unexpected turns and incidents. The true Artist, however, aims to have every action, and especially every crisis, properly *motived*—to use a German expression—and to banish accident altogether.

So ends the first part of Portia's career; she has solved the problem of marriage. Now a wholly new field awaits her. Up to this point (towards the end of the third act) the drama has produced three happy pairs of lovers, Portia and Bassanio, Nerissa and Gratiano, Jessica and Lorenzo, who are all brought together in the pleasant halls of Belmont, Portia's country-seat. But those very means which caused this blissful union have in another direction called forth a terrific collision. Suddenly upon this tender scene there lights the demon of ill news; word comes to Bassanio that his dearest friend Antonio, to whom he owes all his present happiness, is in imminent danger of being sacrificed by the Jew. It falls like a thunderbolt in their midst and scatters the company in every direction. Leaving Lorenzo and Jessica behind, they all quit Belmont at once, animated with one purpose—to rescue Antonio. Bassanio goes direct to his friend; Portia hits upon an indirect mode of procedure which need not be here detailed. The main point to be noticed is that Portia succeeds, Bassanio does not. This is specially emphasized by the poet: Bassanio with all his money, or rather her money, fails, while Portia is the chosen mediatrix. With what skill she fulfilled her mission has been shown in the previous

essay. It will be recollect that the collision which she is now called upon to mediate is there stated to be between Formal Law and what may be termed the Right of Mercy. Now it is essentially the same struggle through which Portia has just passed; she had been able to master the difficulty and assert her principle. Having thus gone through the fire herself, and knowing the frequent injustice of formal authority, she now sallies forth in defence of injured innocence. It is true that her father's will was enforced by prescription rather than by law. But it is the same principle fundamentally, and in both cases Portia steps forth as the champion of the Right of Subjectivity. It is confessed that Antonio is wholly innocent; he has not even willed, much less committed, any wrong, yet he is about to be sacrificed on the altar of legality. She comes, therefore, to cut the toils of the law when they have entangled a pure heart. It will thus be seen that she has been educated to meet just this crisis by her own experience.

But, however well fitted for the task she may be, there must be some motive to impel her forth. It has already been stated that, in the external course of the drama, Portia was the primal cause, or rather occasion, of Antonio's falling into the hands of the Jew. Bassanio needs money to carry on his courtship; he applies to his friend Antonio, who resorts to the Jew, and thus becomes his victim. Hence it is not at all out of place that she should become the instrument to make good the evil which she had unwittingly done. But when it is added that this same man was the dearest friend of her husband, and the chief means of her obtaining the one whom she loved, the motive must be for her all-powerful. Portia is a truly ethical character—she is one with her husband in feeling and interest. Her whole struggle hitherto has been in order that she might make a rational marriage, unite with the man of her heart. Anything, therefore, which affects him profoundly, must affect her in an equal degree, as she is an organic member of that unity called Family. Now Bassanio is so deeply attached to Antonio that he would even sacrifice his hard-won wife to effect the rescue of Antonio. It is this sympathy, this oneness of feeling with her husband, which impels her to undertake the difficult enterprise. The pang

which thrills his heart must pierce hers ; the impulse which drives him forth cannot leave her behind. That woman expressed unconsciously the deepest principle of her nature who said to her sick husband, "My dear, I have a pain in your breast."

But why should the mediatorial character be sustained by a woman? In this respect, also, we claim the poet is true to human nature. For it is just the subjective side of mind which is prominent in woman and distinguishes her from man, who lays much more stress upon the validity of the objective world. So strong is this tendency in him that he is apt to disregard the other element. Hence we see in the trial-scene that the judge and citizens are all on the side of Antonio, yet they quail before that objective reality called Law. By no means let it be understood that these remarks are directed against Law ; on the contrary, it is the greatest conservative power of humanity. But it has its limitations, and these we are insisting upon. Nor will it be denied that woman is the fittest person to plead for mercy, since it tallies so thoroughly with her subjective, emotional nature. So appropriate is all this that we feel that Portia never unsexes herself, nor even manifests any of the unlovely traits of strong-mindedness, though her adventures may well strike terror into any imitators.

Now, what is the secret of this characterization? Shakespeare has made Portia assume the most hazardous disguises and perform the boldest acts, acts from which any woman might well shrink ; and yet we feel that she is always womanly — nay, the most womanly of women. The great majority of Shakespeare's prominent female characters have one trait, however varied they may otherwise be: subordination to the Family. It is a devotion to husband, parent, child, lover ; they live but for one object—to be absorbed into the existence of another. By themselves, they feel that they are nothing ; only in the unity of feeling, interest and existence with another do they have any happiness in life. The complete cancellation of the individual through emotion, not consciously but instinctively, is the grand characteristic which Shakespeare gives to his women ; that is, to those whom he wishes to portray as good and dutiful. On the contrary, his

bad women are, for the most part, marked by quite the opposite of this quality. Such are the limits in which Shakespeare's female characters move. Now that just this trait forms the charm of woman few men will deny. Though wit, fancy, learning, may call forth admiration, there must be something quite different to subdue. It is not servitude, but the willing subordination to the higher end, self-sacrifice in its most exalted form. We believe that it is this consideration which makes us ever respect Portia; her motive is pure devotion to her husband, complete oneness with his interests and friendships, added no doubt to gratitude toward that man (Antonio) who has been chiefly instrumental in making her the happiest of mortals. For Antonio is a stranger to her, so far as we know; why should she assume the disguise and run the risk of an ignominious exposure and tarnished reputation? No; she has that complete harmony and unity with her husband, that his joys are her joys, his sorrows her sorrows, and she has the same interest in her husband's friend as the husband himself. Thus she is a truly ethical character, ethical in the sense that she instinctively subordinates herself to the highest end of woman.

Such is the motive which impels Portia forth to the rescue of Antonio. Just here occurs the seeming contradiction in her character. Hitherto she has asserted boldly and strongly her individual rights; she has trampled upon custom and even law when they have stood in the way of her purposes. But the moment she is united with Bassanio, all is changed. She yields up her whole being to another, who is, of course, equally devoted to her; this daring and resolute will is now at peace and submissive; and her expression of subordination is as absolute as language can make it:

— “though for myself alone
I would not be ambitious in my wish,
To wish myself much better; yet for you
I would be trebled twenty times myself
She is not bred so dull but she can learn;
Happiest of all in that her gentle spirit
Commits itself to yours to be directed
As from her lord, her governor, her king.
Myself and what is mine to you and yours
Is now converted; but now I was the lord
Of this fair mansion, master of my servants,
Queen of myself, and even now, but now
This house, these servants, and this same myself,
Are yours, my lord.”

Now what is the solution of these contradictory traits? *Portia insists upon the subjective principle only in order that her union with her husband may be more complete.* She has struggled for the Right of Choice. To what end? Since the oneness of the marriage-tie is based upon emotion, she insists that emotion in this sphere must have absolute validity. Every hindrance must be set aside; the more intense and unobstructed the affection, the more perfect the bond of unity. Thus she has asserted her individuality with the single purpose that her subordination might in the end be more complete, and that her marriage might be truer and more rational.

A great many persons are inclined to rebel at this sudden swallowing up of individuality, and at the first glance it does seem a hard destiny. Yet it will require but little examination of the actual world to discover that all true living is coupled with just such abnegation of self, indeed that life would otherwise be impossible. Goethe in his later writings has often laid much stress upon the Renunciation of the Individual; and the great poets, philosophers, and moralists, in their own different ways, have repeated the same lesson. To live for a universal end is not merely desirable but necessary, and forms the basis of moral action. All organization, society, state, demand the subordination of particular ends, motives, and desires; otherwise institutions of every kind would be quite impossible. The truth is, the individual would perish through his own self-contradiction were he not subsumed. So the family organism requires the same renunciation from man and woman; both must sacrifice their self-will and submit themselves to the higher end. In fact, love is the emotional, and hence unconscious and unwilling cancellation of the individual; it means that a person finds his whole happiness, indeed even his existence, not in himself but in another. It is from these considerations that we perceive Portia's character to be a harmonious Whole, springing from one central thought, and true in the profoundest sense to human nature. Portia thus stands as the type of the rational woman, rational in what she resists and in what she accepts, rational in rebellion and in submission. She is a strong character, yet not strong-minded in the special sense of this term; she

withers not, like a delicate flower, at the first rude blast, but maintains her individual right till to yield becomes duty.

The remaining characters need not be long dwelt upon. Bassanio is made worthy of Portia by his devotion to his friend, and she perceives him to be a true man. He is even ready to sacrifice his new bride on the altar of friendship, through which alone he has gained her. Bassanio is the means by which Antonio has come into difficulty; Bassanio's prosperity has been Antonio's adversity, but he is willing to forego it all for the sake of the friend to whom his good luck is owing. Thus his devotion is complete, every shade of selfishness is stripped off, and we behold the worthy husband of Portia. Gratiano and Nerissa serve chiefly as mirrors for the leading characters to reflect motives, thoughts, and sentiments. They have little distinct individuality, yet are very necessary to show other persons. Nerissa does little but exhibit her mistress, and the same function is performed for Antonio by Solanio and Solarino. One of the under-currents of the play, which however soon mingles with the main stream, is the story of Jessica, the daughter of the Jew. Here again we have the assertion of the right of choice against the will of the parent, the same collision as Portia's. But it is in a wholly different soil and atmosphere, and hence the fruit is different. Portia respects all the formalities of her deceased father's testament; Jessica tramples without scruple upon all the commands and prejudices of a living father, and steals his money besides. Portia's father was said to have been wise and just; we know the character of Shylock, and what his daughter's education must have been. Hence the great difference in the moral character of the two children. The same collision occurs in the clown Gobbo, but in a form so low, so devoid of content, that it becomes ridiculous—in fact, a burlesque. It appears here as duty to a master who starves and abuses against the right of running away. Gobbo succeeds, after a subtle piece of argumentation, in reconciling his conscience with his desire, and then takes to his heels. Thus in Portia, Jessica, and Gobbo, there is seen a gradation of the same collision.

The fourth act terminates the leading collision of the play, that between Shylock and Antonio. The one has been pun-

ished, the other rescued. Why, then, is the fifth act added? It is because the minor complications, which are brought about by the leading collision and form a necessary element of it, are not yet solved. Portia and Bassanio have been violently separated, likewise Gratiano and Nerissa, by the main struggle; when this is at an end, there is no longer cause for separation; but they must quickly rebound to their former union, which is their only rational existence. Hence the return, which is the theme of the fifth act, is a logical moment of the whole drama. If there be mediation, it must be complete in every part. Moreover, Bassanio and Gratiano are as yet ignorant of the share their wives have had in accomplishing the great mediatorial act. To be sure, we, the audience, or the reader, know all about the matter, but it is certainly not our duty to supply the missing elements of a work of art. If such were the case, the greatness of the poem would depend upon the greatness of the hearer or reader; that is, his ability to make it perfect. In short, a drama, or any work of art, must be complete in itself, an Objective Whole, not dependent upon anybody to supply its omissions, and the characters must be intelligible not merely to us but to one another. Hence the fifth act may be called the Return; the characters pass out of the realm of difference and contradiction into the world of harmony. It opens with an idyllic strain which at once ushers us into the nature of the place; we are now in the land of love; Lorenzo and Jessica in responsive song celebrate the heroes and heroines of romantic devotion. Next the sweet strains of music arise, the language of emotion and harmony. So there is diffused over the whole scene the atmosphere of love and concord. Finally, the parties return separately from their struggle into the land of harmony; the rescued Antonio is there as the mark of triumph. The difficulty about the rings is only temporary; their hearts are right, and that is the main thing; for it would ill become Portia, after her crusade against the most weighty formalities, to insist upon the formality of a ring. Even the ships return to smooth over the last trouble; and the concord is perfect when the story of the disguise is told. It is worth noticing that Shakespeare has here localized his themes; the abode of quiet is at a distance from the place of strife; so

Belmont is the land of Harmony and Love, which they leave in the hour of struggle, and to which they come back in the hour of peace. This may be a violation of that critical canon which demands Unity of Place, but it is a rule which Shakespeare very often follows, and which it would not be difficult to justify.

To sum up in a few words our results. The collision is between Antonio and Shylock, and is mediated by Portia. Its logical basis is the contradiction between the Objective as realized in the institutions of Reason and the Subjective, or the individual side of man. The former undertakes to crush the latter, through which alone it had existence, for it is posited by the Subjective; hence it becomes contradictory of itself and is negated. The Subjective, since it is not universal, is in its turn a new self-contradiction, and hence a negation of itself, which results in its subsuming itself under the Objective. So Portia asserts subjectivity only to end in subordinating herself to one of the forms of objective reality—the Family.

The external movement of the drama may be divided into three parts: 1. The Union; 2. The Separation; 3. The Return. Each of these parts is determined and complemented by the others. The Union, by which is meant the bringing together of the three pairs, has produced the collision between Antonio and Shylock, which then returns and dissolves it, for this Union cannot consistently destroy the one who brought it about. Hence the second step, the Separation, results necessarily from the first. But the parties must overcome this diremption, for they are rationally united, and the collision itself must be mediated; hence the obstacles are removed, and there follows the third stage of the movement, namely, the Return. This when completed is the same as the first Union, but with the collision which was involved in it harmonized. Here the play must end; no further action is possible. Or, to take more abstract terms, we may express these three stages as Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis. That this movement is a type of the movement of Reason itself, needs not to be told to the Thinker. Every spiritual process involves the same moments, and a work of Art as the child of imaginative Reason must bear the image of the parent.

BOOK NOTICES.

Concord Days. A. Bronson Alcott. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1872.

There are two sides or phases to the "Practical." The practical includes what is instrumental, subsidiary—a means to an end. This, so far as man is concerned, has relation first to his bodily wants: food, clothing, and shelter—to their satisfaction and supply; secondly, the ministration toward his spiritual wants which crave culture, or the ascent above individual limitations, and the realization of the generic ideal of humanity or Mind. In other words, the practical endeavor of Man must neutralize his immediate and slavish dependence on Nature (relieve him from the sensuous importunity of hunger, heat and cold, external intrusion), and it must enable him to realize in himself as particular individual the universal, or the consciousness of his entire species—the human race.

The first phase of the Practical looks to providing the means for the sustenance of the body; the body is, however, an instrument for the soul, or for the purposes of conscious being. Hence this phase looks to the creation of an instrument for an instrument—thus a double mediation.

The second phase of the Practical is ministerial directly to the final end, the Consciousness of Man. Subtract consciousness, and the possibility of the practical altogether vanishes. There must be a conscious adaptation in any one or all of its phases. A complete and entire consciousness of it—a comprehension of its entire scope—may be found, however, in few people. This necessary knowledge commonly takes on a partially unconscious form, the form of *conviction*, or religious faith. The individual looking out upon the world of instrumentalities, the infinite complex of mediations, is unable to trace it through to the end, and therefore borrows from the SEER his insight in the form of a Divine Revelation, and by its light believes that he possesses a personality which is absolute end and beyond all subservience to mere outward uses.

The Practical as regards provision for bodily wants has an incidental higher use. It is not simply for the neutralization of the physical pangs and inconvenience—the rendering of the same a nullity—that the bulk of human endeavor goes to the supply of the body. If all this were merely to still the Cerberean dog, the economy of Providence might be doubted. In stilling the clamor of the body, man is obliged to resort to social and political combination. The division of labor in Civil Society, the institution of the Family and the State,—all these are initiated to relieve man from the degrading slavery to bodily sensation. But only "initiated" for these institutions, all serve directly a spiritual end; when Spirit can provide for the body incidentally while providing in the most direct way for the Soul, then it has achieved freedom, for the External no longer sways or swerves.

In these great institutions—Family, Society, and the State—mankind arrives at the necessary conditions of spiritual combination. These it would organize therefore as mere forms, were there no material need to goad it

on—provided, once for all, that mankind had achieved rational insight into the means and demands of culture. But as the consciousness of the Race develops in Time, and is a *historical* existence and not an Absolute one, it follows that the bodily necessities with their pricking pangs are useful as initiatives,—nay, even necessary. Here the divine Providence is manifest: Nature urges herself to complete introversion, and the “breath of Life” is compelled to sustain itself by contest with the clay dwelling in which it finds itself. In satisfying the physical, the spiritual is excited to activity, and gradually gains ascendance and independence. The “mask of life” and the subjection of the Spiritual to material ends is seen to be only *Maya* — a mere delusion of the senses. All this servitude and slavery has been only for self-knowledge, and for the freedom of the self from the self—the realization of the Universal in the Particular. In Jordan’s beautiful version of the “*Sigfridsage*,” the spiritual lineaments of that old Northern-Mythic presentation of this greatest Fact of Existence are thus portrayed:*

“ Und hinunter in’s Nachtreich der nichtigen Schatien
 Versank von der Seele Brunhildens der Selbstschein,
 Die qualvolle Lüge der Larve des Lebens,
 Der Traum des Tropfens der sich getrennt hat
 Vom ewigen Urquell: er sei nur was Eignes,
 Er könne sich mehren ohne zu mindern,
 Er könne zerstören ohne zu sterben
 Mordern und martern, ohne Mitpein,
 Er dürfe verdammend in heillosem Dünkel
 Zum übrigen Dasein “Du” nur sagen,
 Ohne dass achzend die Antwort laute:
 ch, das Urall, bin In dir wie Aussen;
 Unheil üben ist eigenes Elend
 Und wo du folterst da musst du fühlend
 Die Bosheit büßen; den Alles BIST du.”

The blind Samson grinds in the mill, not for others but for himself; the imprisonment in sensuous being must be broken by pain and stern renunciation. When it is done, down falls that lying torment, the Mask of Life

* In Mr. Davidson’s translation:

“ And down to the night-realm of shadowy nothings
 Sank the seeming of self from the soul of Brunhilde,
 The martyring lie of the mask of living,
 The dream of the drop that hath withdrawn it
 From the primal source, as itself were something,
 Weening to wax, while nothing waneth;
 To rend asunder and yet not suffer;
 To doom to perdition, secure of dying;
 o murder and mangle and not be maimed;
 With damning conceit and self-assertion,
 To say *Thou*, in addressing the rest of Existence,
 Nor hear the answer, in agony echoet:—
 ‘I, the prime All, am within as without thee;
 Who worketh woe, to himself doth work it.
 Attempt to torture, thou shalt in astonement
 Ache for thine evil, for thou art all things.’ ”

(die qualvolle Lüge der Larve des Lebens), and the soul looks through the interval upon the unveiled Eternal Verities. The Universal, the Absolute, God, is the root of this Ego which I call myself, and when I free myself from the glare of the senses (which cause selfishness in place of self-consciousness) I shall live and have my being in the presence of this great fact.

“Before I was a Me, in God then was I God,
As soon as I shall die I shall again be God,”

says Angelus Silesius. And Fichte, in a sonnet, says (in Seeley's translation):

“The Eternal One
Lives in my life and sees in my beholding.
Nought is but God, and God is nought but Life.
Clearly the veil of things rises before thee.
It is THYSELF! What though the *Mortal* die?
And hence there lives but God in thine endeavors,
If thou wilt look through that which lives beyond this death
The veil of things shall seem to thee as veil,
And unveiled thou shalt look upon the Life divine.”

But there is a possibility of undervaluing that portion of our life which is called *secular* to distinguish it from the direct, conscious seeking of the Divine. As already stated, the whole realm of the Secular—the Family, Society, and the State—is also directly tributary to the divine life of Man.

It is not a mere instrumentality for the purpose of silencing the beast of the body, but rather is it the propædeutics of human combination and communication wherein spiritual life becomes a reality, a fixed fact. The division of labor and exchange of productions are the apparent ends of industry, but the cunning of Spirit uses them merely as means for the circulation of ideas. The real Practical result is the addition to consciousness of new foreign material—the appropriation of points of view that were alien to it. By solving (spiritually digesting) the contradiction between its own ideas and those of the new people with whom it comes in contact, it rises to more universal and truer ideas. The contrast between this commerce and the material commerce is to be marked. In material commerce the goods are to be consumed and rendered null; in the commerce of ideas, both parties gain, and neither lose anything.

By this discussion we have only sought the stand-point of the Idealist. Whether he be the mystic, the religious man, or the speculative philosopher, he regards the world as a “fleeting show,” considered by itself, and the great fact of the Universe to be the Immanence of Spirit, of the Divine Person. In this he is not necessarily “impractical,” but is quite likely to be intensely the contrary.

Mr. Alcott, the author of “Concord Days,” is widely known as one of the most uncompromising idealists in our time, or in all time. His early acceptance of the doctrine of “The Lapse” nearly as Plotinus taught it, together with his remarkable original statements of it, make him note-worthy in the history of modern thought. A brief discussion will make this apparent.

MR. A. B. ALCOTT'S APERÇU, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES AND RELATIONS TO OTHER SYSTEMS.**I.**

Mr. Alcott's first principle is Person—or the absolute self-reflection—that which knows itself purely.

Hence it is a speculative stand-point. All stand-points are material which posit at the basis a fixed or rigid substance, a realized multiplicity, whether the same be called simply matter, force, law, form, cause, essence, ideas, or archetypes, &c., &c.; while, on the other hand, all stand-points are speculative which posit a self-moving, self-making pure act at the basis, whether they call it God, Person, or Idea, its proper names, or any of the other terms mentioned.

A demonstration that Person or Idea is the Absolute Principle, and that nothing else can be, would run somewhat as follows:

a. Being is either dependent or independent: if the latter, it is by itself; and if the former, it exists in another which is independent.

b. Actual Being is either determined through itself or another: if the latter, it is finite, not self-contained, not a totality; if the former, it is self-contained and infinite.

c. Hence all being is self-determined and independent, or else exists in and through a self-determined and independent.

d. That which is self-determined or self-made is not subordinate to Time and Space, but generates them in its own process; for if it were subordinate to Time and Space, it would be externally determined, and thus a dependent somewhat.

e. This self-determined Being is what we name God, Spirit, or Idea (in the sense of person).

Remarks.—In this proof we have taken the reflective method: a very deficient form, because we are forced to jump from one beginning to another. We have an insight into the true stand-points at first, and then construct a bridge to get to them. The genetic or dialectic method, on the other hand, unfolds the progress of discovery as well as its grounds. The method used above is similar to the mathematical method. It jumps across the river to get a plank to make a bridge with. Of course, itself does not need a bridge; it kindly makes one for others.

But the genetic method gives the wings with which the discoverer flew across the chasm. All these strictures on the method employed here will become evident on looking at the beginning, which is gratuitously assumed without explaining why it is done.

In the Geometric demonstration I draw this construction and that, but give no explanation of the why. Thus it is an external procedure when contrasted with the dialectic method.

Thus one may have a speculative stand-point and not a speculative procedure. It may be without any procedure, a mere positing of the various degrees of the finite; or these degrees may have the reflective nexus exemplified. Or, finally, the dialectic may be given, and in this case the whole system is speculative. This prepares us for a view of the second stage in Mr. Alcott's Philosophy—

THE DESCENT (*Abfall*) OR LAPSE OF THE SOUL, AS PRESENTED BY MR. ALCOTT.

II.

- a. The first Principle, or God, is a Person—a self-determining, or creative, self-dirempting, or self-dissecting.
- b. He creates that which is most like Himself—hence self-determined or creative beings. They differ from the Absolute Person only in degree; they are pure souls.
- c. These pure souls may lapse or may not. They have the possibility of lapse, since they are free.
- d. Those that lapse create thereby bodies for themselves; and, lapsing still further, generate the lower animals; and, these continuing the lapse, beget the plant-world; and thence results the inorganic world.
- e. The limit to the lapse is the atom [i.e. complete self-externality, or space, or chaos].

This Scheme has the following advantages as a view of the world:

- A. (a) It recognizes Person as the only substantial, and all else as dependent thereon. This is the opposite of the materialistic scheme.
- (b) It places next to the Person, as the substance, that which is most like it, as being the most substantial; that which is least personal, is least substantial and most dependent, hence is placed last as depending on the dependent.
- B. It represents all creation as through thought.
- (a) The total thought of God thinks the total, and thus Himself as His own object, or Pure Spirit.
- It is only finite thinking, i.e. an act of thought, which seizes only one moment of the totality, that creates an imperfect being. The finite thought thinks a part or phase as though it were a totality, and thus takes it out of its truth; hence arises untruth. In this sense, the theory of the finite resting on *lapse* is deepest truth.
- (b) It implies that thinking creates its thought (the deep fundamental thought of Aristotle); hence seeing creates what it sees. The divine, harmonious, pure, unlapsed soul comprehends or seizes all in the One or Person; while the lapsed soul, in the form of sense and understanding, creates spectres, i.e. gives validity to abstractions, and thus cannot cancel them and arrive at their negative unity in pure thought. This leads us to the consideration of the positive value of this scheme.

III.

This order of stating the genesis is an order of rank or caste.

- a. Each lower form has its explanation in the next higher or more concrete. The soul sees its moments scattered and isolated in the lower forms in such a manner that each is deficient and demands to be complemented by another.
- b. When we consider the inorganic, we find strange properties—such, for example, as gravity, inertia, or light and heat; we ascend to the organic world and see what all these meant. The lower forms of the organic, such as vegetation, likewise have their explanation in the higher or animal forms,

and the animal has its explanation in man. Thus this system formally justifies itself.

According to Plotinus, "The soul appetizing is the animal. The world of vegetation is the merely reproductive soul. The world-soul is the immediate effective agency of the intellect which is its own object. The longing of the individual, special soul gives it a body; with the body it retains fancy and memory. Below it is the sense-world, and then feeling, desire, and the vegetative life."

In the Fifth Ennead, he has this order:—I. The One; II. The Intellect (dualism). The Primal Essence in its return to itself sees itself, and thus arises knowing or intellect; thus the Primal Essence is dirempted in its unity; as diremption (or intellect) it produces the lower orders.

Proclus considers the One as unrecognizable in itself, and to be cognizable only as it is in its process and return. The relation of the unity to the distinctions which it produces is that of the procession from itself. He shows by a dialectic more or less external how all determinations cancel themselves and return to the One.

In these outlines it will be seen that Proclus is the student of Plato, and that Plotinus is Aristotelian in method. And, what is more surprising to preconceived notions concerning Mr. Alcott, he, like Plotinus, is rather an Aristotelian than Platonist.

Plato's highest principle is the Comprehension or genus (*ἰδέα*). This is the universal particular and individual as one process, hence dialectic throughout. Plato is therefore dialectical, always moving from the Many to the One, like Proclus. His dialectic is more or less mixed with reflections, seldom pure; and his great inferiority to Aristotle is in this, that he does not enunciate so clearly the self-thinking thought to be the first Principle.

When the logical idea finds all its presuppositions, so that its moments or phases become equal to the total, we have the IDEA, in which the dialectic vanishes. There is no longer an external negative unity cancelling the moments, for each moment is its own negative unity, and thus a complete totality. Each one is in the image of the whole, and the whole thus attains extant being, so that in the sphere of the idea we have the identity of Being or immediateness and Comprehension or subjectivity. This is seized by Aristotle in its immediate or elementary phase, and hence he has the appearance of proceeding empirically; for he seizes each stage as a totality, and leaves out the dialectic—unlike Plato. The complete Philosopher should show the genesis of the Idea dialectically, but this is Plato's side. Aristotle assumes it. Plato is always demonstrating the dialectical evolution of the Idea, but leaves the work unfinished.

From this we shall be able to point out the missing links in Mr. Alcott's Philosophy. He leaves out the dialectic entirely, and hence we have no historical Comprehension, but each step is treated as a totality or an idea. When this becomes entirely insufficient, he has recourse to concrete dialectical terms, such as appear in Psychology, or even Physiology, as "appetite," "desire," &c. The starting-point, too, or the genesis whose soul is the dialectic, is rigid, and we advance by reflections or else begin anew

with each link, making a discrete degree. Now, to the mind of the oracle all this is present. The totality hovers before it, but in such an immediate form that the permanent variable cannot be seized. Hence it is that the steps are seized isolatedly, while the mediation of the same remains unconsciously in the subject and is not explicitly stated.

Of course, when the dialectic is left out the series may be inverted without any obvious impropriety. Thus in the present instance we are taught that the most perfect created beings were created first instead of last—which is the Mosaic order and that of the ordinary conception. The apparent difficulty would entirely vanish if the creation of the first pure soul were considered dialectically; for then the links would fall between the Absolute Idea and its realization as Pure Spirit as cancelled moments, and hence not as real evil. As all these intermediate links would have their explanation and *raison d'être* in the Final Cause or perfect spirit, the predicate evil or good could not be applied to them, and hence the obstacle which Plotinus sought to remove (the *real* existence of evil as a creation of the Absolute) is shown to have no absolute existence, but only a relative one to finite consciousness (the reflective understanding). This, perhaps we have reason to believe it, is the true view of those who explain creation through the lapse. They cling to that form of stating it in order to emphasize the hierarchy of Spirit and the dependence of destiny upon Choice, or the freedom of the Will.

In the "Concord Days" we have the art-form of a Diary, the extracts running through the months from April to September inclusive. A second volume, we are told, will continue through the remaining months. It presents us the picture of a literary artist looking over and arranging his choice hours of the day, eliminating from the record of life its petty collisions, and, vintner-like, giving us the expressed serenity and wisdom.

Think of intercourse with one whose life is in intimate communion with the wisest and best of the race. Familiar with Plato, Pythagoras, Boehme, More, Glanvil, Coleridge, and the rapt mystics of all time, he moves about in the atmosphere of the *Paradiso*. It is the atmosphere of Aspiration and Prayer, like that of a Gothic cathedral; of serenity and purity, like that of a Greek temple. One reads books of Correspondence and Diaries chiefly for the society into which they admit him. The more elevated the tone of exposition and of the characters portrayed, the subtler the penetration of its cultivating influences. The Dialogues of Plato and the Lives of Plutarch have accomplished a wonderful work in this respect.

We have in the volume before us the poetry of private life—its universal aspects portrayed. The looseness of form permits private reflections, choice bits of quotation, scenery-painting, personal biography, disquisitions on politics and social science, neighborhood gossip, correspondence, poems from favorite authors, essays on the genius of present and past literary men, and mystic glances into the profounder realms of philosophic speculation. This freedom of form justifies much that in an ordinary book would be considered one-sided, as for example what is said of Carlyle and Goethe.

The Basic Outline of Universology: An Introduction to the newly-discovered Science of the Universe; its Elementary Principles; and the first stages of their development in the Special Sciences. Together with Preliminary Notices of Alwato, the newly-discovered Scientific Universal Language, resulting from the Principles of Universology. By Stephen Pearl Andrews. New York: Dion Thomas. 1872. Pages cxix and 764. Price, \$5.

Contents: Introduction; Notices to the Reader; Vocabulary. Chapter I.—General Statement and Distribution of the Subject; Classification of the whole field of Human Knowledge. Chapter II.—Definitions and Illustrations of *Analogy* and *Correspondence*; General Statement of the Evolution of Thought, hitherto; Principles of Organization and Evolution. Chapter III.—*Analogy* more accurately Defined; Scientific Analogy as the Basis of Universology; the three Fundamental Laws of Universal Science, *Unism*, *Duism*, and *Trinism*, stated, illustrated, and defined. Chapter IV.—*Number*; its Universal Aspects; of the Various Numerical Series, and of the Meanings of Numbers; Introductory Treatment of the Analogues of Form; Parallel Distribution and Tabulation of the total scientific domain and of the several systems and departments of Philosophy; the Great Crisis; Suggestive Programme of Human Destiny. Chapter V.—*Form*; the Science of Pure and Abstract Morphology; and its Relations to Universology, with diagrammatic Illustrations; Points, Lines, Surfaces, and Solids, with their Symbolism or Correspondential Signification. Chapter VI.—Morphology and Universology (continued); their Relations to Human Destiny; the *Grand Reconciliation* of all Intellectual Conceptions, and the Prospective Harmony of the Organic Social Life of Man. Digested Index.

Creator and Creation; or, The Knowledge in the Reason of God and His Work. By Laurens P. Hickok, D.D., LL.D. Boston: Lee & Shepard, Publishers. New York: Lee, Shepard & Dillingham. 1872.

Dr. Hickok is widely known in this country and abroad as one of the pioneers of Philosophy in America. He is a veteran in the service, and one may easily ascertain the importance of his labors by visiting our Educational institutions here in the West, and conversing with those teachers and professors who have to deal with Psychology or any other form of Philosophy. He will find that, in proportion to the depth and originality of the views presented for his consideration, a ready acknowledgment of obligation to the writings of Dr. Hickok will be confessed.

Among those whose profound study of Kant enabled them to come before the world with a new version of Philosophy founded on the Critical system, Dr. Hickok stands in the foremost rank. Such as Hamilton, Balmes, Cousin, indeed, have failed in attaining so positive a grasp of the categories of pure thought as our author.

His merit lies primarily in seizing the Kantian criterion of *a priori* ideas—universality and necessity—and in holding this firmly and confidently. In discriminating carefully between ideas and opinions, by means of this criterion the speculative philosopher will find his first task. The moral philosopher, likewise, will find no other foundation for his science.

The increasing influence of Positivism and the various materialistic schools of thought may be considered the occasion of the present book, and

its welcome will be cordial among those who have experienced the vicious circle described in the preface thus:

"An assumed Revelation may be studied and its facts arranged with much learning; but when a profound skepticism meets us, and drives us back of the facts, and asks for the validity of prophecy, and miracles, and inspiration; and even for the being of a God who can foreknow, and work miracles, and inspire human messengers,—we are thrown directly back upon these old assumptions of Nature's connections. No sense-experience puts within the consciousness anything by which Logic alone can enable us to know that which beyond Nature supports and connects Nature; and thus the logical understanding is driven helplessly to swing on the circle, of taking the Bible's God to make and hold together Nature, and then to take Nature's God to make and reveal the facts of the Bible."

Among the admirable things in this book will be found the able treatment of Positivism and the solution of the Darwinian problem. Aristotle, indeed, when he set up the doctrine of Final Cause as the ultimate explanation of all Natural phenomena, knew the last word on Natural Selection as a philosophic theory. "Not sex instinct, but the Absolute Ideal, determines the higher unity of all species," says our author.

In his attempt at a speculative construction of Nature, his chapters on Antagonist force, D iremptive force, and Revolving force; on Life, Sense, and Reason,—are profound and suggestive, resting as they do upon a chapter devoted to Space and Time—a chapter that Kant himself might have written. But we must mention the descriptive sketch of the historical development of Critical Philosophy, which he divides into three stages or epochs:—1st, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; 2^d, Fichte's Science of Knowledge; 3^d, Hegel's Science of Logic. To the latter he concedes: "That it is the entire compass of all knowledge, so far as the *subjective process* of knowing is concerned. The most searching criticism will find scarcely anything, perhaps utterly nothing, to object to it as a process complete of the science of *Thinking*." When the question is asked, "What is this worth intrinsically, as philosophy of *knowing overt realities?*" we think some other predicate than "worthless" will be given if one remembers that all this is but the genetic unfolding of the Universal and Necessary, which is equally objective and subjective, inasmuch as it furnishes not only the forms of pure thought but the logical conditions of all phenomena. As the *à priori* science of Mathematics gives us the means of cognizing matter and motion, so the *à priori* system of pure thought gives us the ideas through which to interpret human history, science, and institutions; and also natural phenomena and the empirical sciences. The recognition of pure thought as embodied and realized in the world of man and matter is Hegel's chief work, and throughout its entire extent empirical results are taken as the raw material. On page 128-9, it is difficult to agree with Dr. Hickok when he seems (contrary to the general purpose of his book) to teach that God's Absolute thought is not solid enough for the real world; i.e. that Creation is not God's thought; or that the Absolute thinking-process is confined to a subjective time and space which cannot be the time and space of human, conscious experience. Not only Hegelians, but the followers of Malebranche and Berkeley—indeed the whole race of Platonists and Aristotelians—must enter protest against that.

Back Volumes

OF THE

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That a set of the "Journal" constitutes in some measure a Library of Philosophy in itself, will appear from the following list selected from the contents of the six volumes:

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[See next page.]

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